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A Union Member's Right of Free Speech
and Assembly: Institutional Interests

and Individual Rights
Professor Atleson focuses on sections 101 (a) (1) and
101(a)(2) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 and their effect in providing a Bill
of Rights for union members. Examining the legislative history of these sections and their present interpretation by the courts, the author concludes that the act's
attempt to preserve the institutional interests of the
union while insuring union members considerable freedom in the areas of speech and assembly has received
insufficient analysis and appreciation. The author attempts to develop standardsto accommodate institutional
concerns about libel, factionalism, and dual unionism
with Congress' concern about individualrights.

James B. Mleson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Individuals can find the security and protection that are prerequisites for freedom only in association with others-and
then the organization these associations take on, as a measure
of securing their efficiency, limits the freedom of those who
have entered into them. 1
Joint undertakings by individuals in face-to-face associations
are necessary to control or offset the impersonal economic forces
affecting individual freedom. As Dewey implied in the quotation above, however, private associations demand a measure of
individual surrender to the established aims of the organization.
Although some surrender of individual whims and desires is required, the extent to which associations can demand subservience is a serious and continuing question. When the private
organization begins to take on the importance and power of public governments in the lives of its members, a new conflict develops. The loss of individual freedom within private associations creates a threat to the freedom-producing goals of pluralism itself, and establishes the basis for governmental intervention to protect private democratic rights in the name of plural* Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at
Buffalo.
1. DEWEY, FREEDOM AND CuLTURE 166 (1939).
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ism. The irony of this intervention should not obfuscate its
inevitability.
The tension between the ideal pluralistic society in which
independent power centers exist to counterbalance the power of
the state and the interests of the state in guaranteeing fair play
within these power centers is reflected in the long debate
concerning union democracy. Those advocating the error, as
well as the futility, of governmental intervention into intraunion affairs were rebuffed by those feeling that intervention
was required to protect democratic rights in those private institutions exerting great economic power over the lives of men.
This long debate need not be repeated here, for federal intervention to protect democratic, participatory rights in union affairs
became a reality with the passage of the Labor Reform Act of
1959.2
Participatory rights in internal union affairs, as in governmental affairs, consist of a number of different rights and involve the entire decision making process. Speech and assembly are crucial, but so are the right to vote and the right to hold
the governing body accountable to the membership.
The Labor Reform Act of 1959 provided union members
with rights considered necessary for democracy in unions, and
there is a marked parallel between the rights granted and the
federal Bill of Rights. This Article will focus upon the scope
of freedom of speech and assembly protected by sections 101
4
(a) (1) 3 and 101(a) (2).
Each section will be analyzed in terms of its scope and purpose. Given the paucity of judicial decisions and lack of meaningful legislative history, many of the problems raised, both
theoretical and practical, have not arisen in the course of litigation. Since ambiguity and uncertainty tend to deter members
from seeking legal counsel, and counsel from advising litigation,
the lack of judicial activity is not a reflection of the importance
of the endeavor.
The right to question and criticize union officers must be
protected to guarantee democratic functioning. The right to
vote is hollow without the supporting right to communicate,
debate union policies and criticize officers' conduct, and, of
2. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
(Landrum-Griffin Act), 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as LMRDA].
3. 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1964).
4. 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2) (1964).
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course, the right to meet with those holding similar views and
form opposition groups. Because emphasis will be placed upon
the interpretation of statutory provisions, and judicial decisions
are limited, reference to cases dealing with other rights granted
by sections 101 (a) (1) and 101 (a) (2) will be necessary.
Title I was not considered by Congress to be a comprehensive
code of rights for union members, but, rather, a statement of
minimum standards. Furthermore, Congress was aware that
the act supplemented an existing body of state law and expressly considered this extensive development a concurrent
source of rights and remedies. 5
Although the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947 sought to
regulate internal affairs, controls were indirect and their effect
upon the union-member relationship was slight.6 Congress was
primarily concerned with protecting employment rights, especially the right to work as a non-union member. 7 The doctrine of
fair representation provided protection against grosser forms of
discrimination, but only state law regulated intra-union conflict
and democratic participation.
The LMRDA approached specific labor problems in a manner radically different from that taken by prior legislation. The
rights granted are stated in terms of a citizen's democratic rights,
and each member's rights under Title I are to be enforced by
private litigation. Protection of these rights was felt to be the
minimum necessary intrusion into union self-government. By
analogy of private to public governments, it is recognizable that
it no longer suffices to protect individual rights solely from governmental power because the concentration of economic power
in our society dictates individual protection whether that power
5. See LMRDA §§ 103, 306, 403, 603, 604. See generally Summers,
Pre-emption and The Labor Reform Act-Dual Rights and Remedies, 22
Omo ST. L.J. 119 (1961); Summers, The Impact of Landrum-Griffin in
State Courts, N.Y.U. 13TH CoxF. ON LABOR 333 (1960).
6. See Aaron, U.S. Report, 18 RUTGERS L. Rsv. 279, 280-83 (1964).
7. Id. at 281. Although NLRA section 8(b) (1) (A), 61 Stat. 136
(1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1964), proscribed union restraint or coercion of employees, the section expressly does not "impair the right of a
labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein." Thus, union discipline was
not hampered by the NLRA, and common law standards provided the
only guarantees of fair treatment. The NLRA did, however, separate
union membership from the employee's retention of his job. Under
sections 8(b) (2) and 8(a) (3), expulsion from union membership in a
union shop situation may not lawfully result in the employee's loss of
his job as long as he is willing to tender uniform and nondiscriminatory
fees and dues.
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is held in the public or private sphere.8 This analogy is more
than an analytical tool, for private decisions often are as critical
as public ones. Indeed, "the interests which are the subject of
determination and regulation within the union organization are
among those which come closest to home.""
II.

A BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The legislative history of Title I has been discussed in depth
elsewhere,' 0 and thus will only be summarized here. Legislative debates, unfortunately, shed little light on the questions and
problems raised by the statute. Even the humorous admonition
to look at the statute only if legislative history is ambiguous is
not helpful since the statute itself is vague and contradictory.
In the late 1950's, the initial bills for internal union reform"
focused primarily on election and financial controls. The serious
disclosures of the McClellan special committee hearings 12 dealt
with the misuse of union funds for private gain, conflicts of interests, and "sweetheart" arrangements between union officials
and employers. The subversion of democratic practices in unions
8. Blurnrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61
McCH. L. REV. 1435, 1436 (1963).
9.

Wirtz, Government by Private Groups, 13 LA. L. REv. 440, 448

(1953).

10. Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform
Act of 1959, 58 MIcH. L. REV. 819 (1960); Levitan & Loewenberg, The

Politics and Provisions of the Landrum-Griffin Act, in

REGULATING

UNXON

28 (Estey, Taft & Wagner ed. 1964); Rothman, Legislative
History of the "Bill of Rights" for Union Members, 45 MINN. L. REv. 199
GOVERNMENT

(1960); Smith, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of

1959, 46 VA. L. REV. 195 (1960). For an interesting analysis of the political pressures involved, see McADAims, PowER AND PoLITIcs IN LABoR
LEGISLATION (1964).
11. The Democratic leadership's primary vehicle for internal union
reform was the Kennedy-Ervin Bill introduced in January, 1959. S. 505,
86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959). The bill was basically the Kennedy-Ives
Bill of 1958 which had passed the Senate but died in the House. S. 3974,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). Kennedy's initial proposal dealt with financial reporting and trusteeships, S. 3454, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958),

but the Committee on Labor added election provisions.
12. The Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor
Management Field was composed of members of the Senate Subcommit-

tee on Labor of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee, the proper
investigator of union affairs, and McClellan's Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations, which had made preliminary forays as early as 1956.
Teamster opposition to the Investigations Subcommittee and static from
the Subcommittee on Labor, assumed to be more sympathetic to labor,
prompted McClellan's Solomon-like proposal to form a new committee
composed of members of the two standing committees.
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was a "wholly subordinate theme.' 3 "[E]vidence pointed to
but a handful of irregular or fraudulent union elections, and
only scattered instances of arbitrary expulsions, unfair trial procedures, or encroachments on the democratic rights of union
4
members."'
After the subcommittee hearings on related bills had terminated, Senator McClellan introduced a comprehensive measure including, as Title I, a bill of rights for union members.
Because of McClellan's prestige in the field, the subcommittee
reconvened to consider the measure. 15 A bill was reported
out of committee, but without the guarantees of individual
rights.16 During the Senate debate on the proposal, Senator
McClellan offered as an amendment a "Bill of Rights" embodying the rejected first title of his bill.' 7 The combination of
McClellan's prestige, the difficulty of voting against a "Bill of
Rights," presidential aspirations of various senators, and ignorance of the significance of McClellan's amendment led to its
passage by one vote.'
Opponents of the bill met during the next two days to prepare a substitute. They feared that lower courts would give
the sweeping language of the Bill of Rights its full literal mean13. Summers, American Legislation for Union Democracy, 25 MoDL. REv. 273, 274 (1962).
14. Id. at 274.
15. See Rothman, supra note 10, at 205.
16. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); reprinted in 1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA or 1959, at 397. [Hereinafter cited
as LEG. HIsT.] Indeed, the committee rejected extensive guarantees and
detailed procedures which would interfere with union self-government.
Id. at 7.
17. 105 CONG. REc. 6476 (1959).
18. 105 CONG. REc. 6745 (1959). The breadth of McClellan's proposals are exemplified by the following three sections:
Sec. 101. (a) (1) EQUAL RIGHs.-Every member ... shall have
equal rights and privileges ... including identical voting rights

and equal protection of its rules and regulations.
Sec. 101. (a) (2) FREEDOM or SPEEcH.-Every member . .. shall

have the right to express any views, arguments, or opinions
regarding any matter respecting such organization or its officers, agents, or representatives, and to disseminate such views,
arguments, or opinions either orally or in printed, graphic or
visual form, without being subject to penalty, discipline, or
interference of any kind by such organization.
Sec. 101. (a) (3) FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY.-Every member ...
shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with any other
members for the purpose of exchanging views and reaching
decisions with respect to matters pertaining to such organiza-

tion or its officers, agents, or representatives, without being
subject to penalty, discipline or interference of any kind by
such organization.
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ing.19 They were joined by chagrined southern supporters who
feared that giving the Secretary of Labor authority to protect
private rights would provide an embarrassing precedent in future civil rights debates. 20 Although Kennedy supporters probably had the votes to remove the Bill of Rights provisions, political realities suggested a modified substitute. Thus, one vote had
successfully changed the whole thrust of labor reform legislation
from regulation of financial practices to protection within
21

unions .

The substitute was introduced by Senator Kuchel. "The
draftsmanship left much to be desired, perhaps because of the
haste and stress, the number of participants, and the priority of
tactical acceptability over nicety of expression.122

Neverthe-

less, the amendment in substance was enacted into law as Title I.
The substitute specifically enumerated subjects of federal proreasonable rulemaking and disciplinary
tection and recognized
23
powers of unions.
Senator McClellan's bill had guaranteed equal rights and
privileges without detailing the rights included or their scope
except that the rights were to include "identical voting rights
24
and equal protection of the union's rules and regulations.1
In contrast, the Kuchel substitute limited the equal rights provision to four specifically named rights and recognized the right
of unions to pass reasonable rules and regulations limiting those
rights. No explanation was given for narrowing the range of the
provision or for limiting the provision to the rights specified.
Although a number of Senators stated that enumeration of
rights did not exclude other rights, these "other rights" can only
refer to rights protected by state law under section 103.25 The
Kuchel substitute removed the broad immunity from penalty,
discipline, or interference of any kind, recognized a union's authority to pass reasonable rules for the conduct of meetings,
and permitted union discipline for conduct violating obligations
owed to the union or interfering with the union's legal or contractual obligations.
"[T] actics also triumphed over sound draftsmanship" in the
House. 26 The Landrum-Griffin bill, which eventually passed
See Cox, supra note 10, at 832.
Id. at 832-33.
See Summers, supra note 13, at 274.
Cox, supra note 10, at 833.
23. Reprinted at 2 LEG. HiST. 1220-21.
24. 2 LEG. HIST. 1294.

19.
20.
21.
22.

25. See 2 LEG.

HIST.

1231-34 (remarks by Senator Kennedy).

26. Cox, supra note 10, at 8U3,
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'27
the House, incorporated the Senate-passed "Bill of Rights.
The final House bill was approved on the floor as a substitute
to a committee-approved bill, and the report of the house committee contained almost no discussion concerning the basic provisions of its bill.28 Thus, in neither house was careful committee consideration given to the problems of internal union
democracy or the wording of appropriate federal legislation.
Reading the unenlightening debate in both houses supports
the analysis of Professor Smith:
The record of the debate in Congress reveals a deliberate, if
not extraordinary, effort to becloud, or clarify, or prejudge, as
the case may be. The report filed by the house managers of the
conference [House conferees] contains much that is confusing
as well as clarifying. Thus, resort to legislative history will at
best be difficult, and may
29 serve more to obscure than to illuminate legislative intent.
Turning to the statute for assistance is similarly frustrating.
Since Title I was presented from the floor, it contains the purposeful ambiguities and technical compromises thought necessary to insure passage. Moreover, it was hastily drawn to
modify what had become an inevitable individual rights section
of the act. Consequently, the "courts would be well advised to
seek out the underlying rationale without placing great emphasis upon close construction of the words." 30
The known problems of statutory interpretation take on
gargantuan proportions when attempting to find the underlying
rationale in sections passed by diverse groups with varying purposes and interests. Common denominators turn out to be those
pleasant sounding general principles which cannot decide concrete cases.

III.

SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY RIGHTS UNDER
SECTION 101 (a) (1)

Section 101(a) (1)31 has been assumed to be an equal protec27. Since the two versions of the Bill of Rights were identical, the
conferees had no acknowledged power to alter the language.
28. See Rothman, supra note 10, at 208; H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
29. Smith, supra note 10, at 197-98.
30. Cox, supra note 10, at 852.
31. Equal Rights.-Every member of a labor organization shall
have equal rights and privileges within such organization to
nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the
labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of
such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations in
such organization's constitution and bylaws.
73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1) (1964).
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tion provision, guaranteeing equal application of union bylaws
and constitutional provisions. The purpose of the section is to
provide each member with an equal voice in the decisions which
so vitally affect his working life. Thus, the section outlaws
second-class citizenship-class A and B members, junior and
senior members, or auxiliary and associate members.32 Furthermore, the right to participate in the decision making process
is granted.3 3 However, some difficult, basic questions exist
which have either not been faced or, if faced, not adequately
analyzed.
There is no doubt that Congress primarily conceived of
section 101 (a) (1) as an equal protection clause. Thus, the section probably does not grant any of the enumerated substantive
rights, but merely guarantees equal application of certain rights
granted by union laws. Those rights are limited to the four
specifically mentioned in the section and are subject to reasonable limitations.
3 4
In one of the most striking cases to date, Ragland v. UMW,
the District Court of Alabama held that members of United
Mine Workers, District 50, had no right to vote or otherwise participate in the United Mine Workers Convention because their
charter specifically denied them the right. Although the case
primarily dealt with voting and participatory rights, the approach of the court to the statute is instructive.
The significant portion of the District 50 charter reads:
Said district, its members and subordinate divisions shall acquire no rights in the funds, or to participate in the election or
conventions of the United Mine Workers of America, but shall
have their own autonomy with respect to their elections, conventions and wage negotiations.35
In 1960 plaintiffs complained that the international constitutional convention of the mine workers would soon be held and,
as members in good standing of local unions affiliated with District 50, section 101 conferred equal rights within the international to nominate candidates and vote, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the business of such meetings. The
Ragland court rejected the plaintiff's position on a number of
32.

O'Brien v. Paddock, 61 L.R.R.M. 2429 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Acevedo

v. Bookbinders, 196 F. Supp. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).

33. Allen v. Local 92, Iron Workers, 47 L.R.R.M. 2214 (N.D. Ala.
1960) (shouting down member at meeting); see McFarland v. Building
Material Teamster Local 282, 180 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (arbitrary
ruling on a motion and refusing to put it to a vote).
34.

188 F. Supp. 131 (N.D. Ala. 1960).

35, See id. at 132,
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grounds. In the course of its opinion, the court specifically
pointed out that the equal rights provision was not intended
by Congress:
[to] . . . change the internal organizational structure of unions
but granted rights and privileges to certain locals and members
that were not conferred by the constitution and charter under
which the unions and locals operate. It is the opinion of the
Court that this Act was intended for use in those instances where
'members' as opposed to 'provisional members' are threatened
with a deprivation of their rights that were previously afforded
or granted to them under the unions' constitution and under their
charter. In other words, the Act is designed to protect the right
to vote and participate where that right exists and not for the
purpose of conferring the right to vote and participate in cases
where it has not previously existed or should have existed.3 0
The act, however, does contemplate modifications in the

existing "internal organizational structure" of some unions. As
mentioned earlier, many unions arbitrarily segregate members
by various designations and euphemisms. One purpose of the
section is to prohibit such arbitrary classifications which operate

to deny basic democratic rights to membersaT
The court's emphasis on the fact that rights were never
"given" is regrettable because plaintiffs often have never been
given the right allegedly possessed by other persons similarly
situated. Thus, a typical equal protection situation is one in
which the union grants a right to A but not to B. Surely the
section must operate in this case. There is no significant difference in a situation in which a union bylaw gives a particular
right to A and B but the union officials refuse to permit B to
exercise that right, and a situation in which a right is given to
A alone. The operative effect in both situations is the same:
plaintiff is denied a right granted to or possessed by other persons similarly situated.
The court may well be referring to another aspect of the
problem in rather abstruse language. If the equal rights section

is read literally, there would be no violation in Ragland because
all District 50 members are treated alike-no discriminatory
classification scheme was employed. Thus, although there
36. Id. at 133.
37. Cox, LAw AN NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 102-03 (1960).
The
court's somewhat related view that members had "acquiesced" in their
inferior status for twenty years is also unpersuasive. Prior to the
LMRDA, state court or internal union appeals would have been futile.
Indeed, the LMRDA was passed to remedy many long-standing practices. Section 401(d), for instance, requiring periodic elections for
officers of intermediate union bodies, effectively ends the traditional
appointment process used for UM1W districts and Teamster conferences.
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may be a denial of rights in some sense to all members of District 50, there is no denial of equal rights to the plaintiffs under
section 101 (a) (1). This problem, however, could have been
avoided quite handily in the Ragland case, because, as members
of the United Mine Workers, plaintiffs are arguably entitled to
the same rights as other UMW members. Since these rights
were given under the UMW International constitution and bylaws to other members in other locals, there is a clear problem of
discriminatory classification. Although plaintiffs may have
equal rights with other members of District 50, they certainly do
not have equal rights in relation to other members of the United Mine Workers. The lawmaking body is not District 50
but the International, and, therefore, relevant plaintiffs should
be compared with other members of the United Mine Workers
and not simply with members of District 50.38 Although a
heterogeneous membership may necessitate some classification,
election of International officers affects District 50 members as
directly as other Mine Worker members.
The equal rights problem is not so easily skirted when the
challenged provision is found in the local's constitution or bylaws. In this situation, no group of members under the same
regulation is treated differently. The courts have taken two
distinct approaches. Some courts limit the statute by requiring
classification within the constituent group, while others apply
the section in similar situations without even referring to the
question.
The former approach is reflected by the Cleveland Orchestra Committee case.39 Plaintiffs, calling themselves the Orchestra Committee, brought a class action on behalf of the Cleveland
Orchestra musicians. They claimed a denial of equal rights because they were not allowed to vote on collective bargaining
agreements entered into by the union's executive committee with
their employer. No right of ratification was granted by the
union's constitution or bylaws, although these governing documents could be amended by a majority vote at any regular
meeting.
Since many musicians are employed by a variety of employers for short periods, traditional collective bargaining is
impractical. These members are governed by a wage scale, a
38. Labor organization as defined in § 3 of the act includes locals
as well as nationals and internationals. Thus, an international can violate Title I as can a local labor organization.
39. Cleveland Orchestra Comm. v. Cleveland Fed'n of Musicians,
193 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ohio 1961), affd, 303 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1962).
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unilateral statement of the basic, minimum terms under which
musicians will not work. The wage scale was agreed upon by
the general membership of the Cleveland local. Symphony musicians, on the other hand, were regularly employed and subject
to collective bargaining agreements made by the union officials.
On these facts, the district court held that the statute does
not grant the right to vote on collective agreements unless the
agreement becomes the business of a membership meeting. 40
The obligation to submit contracts to the membership for approval or rejection, the court found, was not specifically granted
by the section. 41 Thus, like Ragland, the court held that the
right claimed to be violated was not protected by section 101.42
The court also implied, in apparent agreement with Ragland,
that the right alleged must stem from the union bylaws and in
this case no such right was granted. Plaintiff, of course, was
arguing that the right was granted to some members but not
to members of the symphony orchestra.
The district court decision was affirmed on a slightly different ground. 43 The Sixth Circuit found no parallel between
the wage scale and the contract because the latter was not a
collective agreement negotiated by the union on the members'
behalf. Furthermore, the musicians may make individual contracts with the orchestra management as long as such contracts
provide at least for the minimum scale for symphony musicians
provided by the contract. Thus, the court seemed to hold that
the symphony members suffered no harm or injustice.
It seems odd, however, to say that members suffer no harm
by not being able to vote on a contract because they can individually modify the contract with their employer. Yet, the
court points out that a member may make a separate contract
for higher pay than that provided in the contract, and a symphony musician and one who has performed only under the
wage scale may both change the categories under which they
work. All this sounds very strange and hearkens back to an
earlier age in labor's history. Plaintiffs, however, were not arguing that their contract or the method of its negotiations neces40. Although members may participate in the deliberations of a
meeting, they would not necessarily have the right to act upon a collective agreement even though the subject were made part of a meeting's
agenda. Union rules may still prevent expression of support or rejection
by members.
41. Cf. Branch v. Vickers, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 518 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
42. See also Fogg v. Randolph, 52 L.R.R.M. 2215 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
43. 303 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1962).
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sarily damaged them financially or discriminated against them
by creating poor working conditions; they desired a significant
opportunity to affect their working conditions. Since symphony
musicians no doubt represent a minority of union members,
their ability to influence negotiations may be limited.
The court's approach echoes the traditional notion, implemented by the common law as well as Congress, that democratic,
participatory interests, if worthy of legal protection at all, deserve a much lower position on the hierarchy of values than
protection of an employee's economic interests.
Finally, almost as an afterthought, the circuit court mentioned that the equal right to approve or reject a contract is not
specifically given under section 101 (a) (1). 4 4 It is not unusual
for contracts to be negotiated without membership approval.
This is merely an extension of the analogy of union government
to representative government. The bargainers are essentially
lawmakers creating with the employer the laws under which
the members will work.45 The key point in the case, however,
is that the right to vote upon a collective bargaining agreement
is not protected by section 101 (a) (1). Therefore, even if there
were a distinction or difference in treatment, the distinction
would not relate to any one of the four specific rights granted
by the section. The act does protect equal rights in "elections or
referendums," but no referendum was held on the symphony
contract. The court, however, overstates the issue by finding
no statutory right to ratify collective agreements, for this right,
as an equal right, is protected if other union members can vote
upon the agreement. That no substantive right is given by sec44. In a concurring opinion, Circuit Judge O'Sullivan found that
musicians in Cleveland were denied equal rights and were discriminated
against. He concurs in affirmance, however, because the section on
which plaintiff relied did not provide protection against such discrimination. Judge O'Sullivan pointed out that for all practical purposes the
term "wage scale and directory" became a part of the contract between
the union musician and his employer, and such an arrangement was
equivalent in substance to a collective agreement. Accordingly, all
union members other than musicians during their performance in a
symphony orchestra, have some control over the terms and conditions
of their employment. Id. at 233.
45. Whether or not members can properly evaluate a collective
agreement without having participated in the negotiations is a serious
question. A vote taken with no real understanding of the contract terms
is of no benefit to members. In explaining the overwhelming rejection
by airline machinists of a negotiated agreement in July, 1966, IAM officials stated that only "terse telegrams were sent to the locals and the
vote was taken less than two days after the agreement was announced."
Washington Post, Aug. 16, 1966, p. 1, col. 1.
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tion 101 (a) (1) except the right to equal treatment in relation to
the four specified rights is a literal, although probably correct,
interpretation. The opinion implies, however, that the opportunity to participate in a referendum on a collective bargaining
agreement is not protected because it is not specified as a right
in the statute. Yet the act prohibits discriminatory treatment
in any election or referendum; there is no limitation as to the
subject matter of the referendum. The question under the act
is whether plaintiffs have been arbitrarily denied a right to
vote upon a contract while other members possess that right.
Moreover, it should not be important that two different referendums are involved, i.e., the wage scale and the collective bargaining agreement.
A clear violation is presented when unskilled workers, for
instance, cannot vote upon a contract which applies to all members, unskilled and skilled. The violation is no less clear if two
contracts are customarily negotiated, one for each group of employees, but only skilled workers may vote to ratify or reject the
contract applicable to them. Thus, it is not sufficient for the
court to find no violation because no member could vote on the
collective bargaining contract. There is another group of members in the same local, the nonorchestra musicians, who do have
control over the wage rates and other working conditions which
apply to them. This would seem to be a classification, although
not necessarily an unreasonable one.
Admittedly, the wage scale represents a necessary approach
for musicians working for short periods for different employers.
The crucial fact, however, is that the scale and the contract establish wages and working conditions for musicians. In one case
musicians work under conditions unilaterally agreed upon, in
the other they work under a contract with an employer. Although each arrangement is dictated by industry demands, one
group of members may not vote upon the conditions regulating
their economic life. The rationality of the two different approaches does not answer the equal protection claim raised by
plaintiffs.
Since the court assumed that the right to reject or approve
a contract was not protected by the section, the reasonableness
of the rule was not considered. However, no rule could be
reasonable and yet deny equal rights. Considering the proviso,
"equal rights" must refer only to a difference in treatment relating to a specified right set out in section 101 (a) (1). This
seems present in the Cleveland OrchestraCommittee case. Thus,
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the proviso is relevant, and the question becomes whether the
denial represents a reasonable regulation. A rule which denies
equality of voting is not necessarily invalid, and the proviso
recognizes that some classification may be necessary. For example, it may be necessary in a local representing employees
from different plants to limit a strike vote or a vote involving a
collective bargaining contract to only those employees directly
affected. In a mixed member union, containing skilled and unskilled workers, or industrial and construction workers like the
IBEW, classification may be necessary. Pure equality would actually weaken self-determination by adding the voting power
of workers with little interest in the merits.46 Although unions
are often viewed as unified bodies designed to promote common
aims through collective action, many unions are confederations
of competing interest groups seeking individual goals.47 The
serious clash of interests represented by jurisdictional disputes
are masked, although still present, by the industrial union structure. Thus, "direct concern" provisions in bylaws and constitutions may be reasonable, although general voting and nonvoting
classifications, for instance, will be invalid.
In summary, a classification scheme was present in Cleveland Orchestrabecause one group of employees was not allowed
to reject or approve a binding agreement dealing with their
wages and working conditions. The rationality of the two approaches is granted, but the rationality of denying only symphony musicians the right to vote on their collective agreement
is doubtful. The "reasonable rule" question was not reached
by the court, however, because the court read section 101 (a) (1)
to exclude the right to participate in a referendum on a collective agreement. Yet, the equal right to vote in any referendum
is protected, and that right was infringed. To argue that no
referendum was held on the contract merely stresses form over
substance.
Suppose, however, that no member of a local may vote on
the collective bargaining contract.48 There would be no viola46. See Cox, supra note 10, at 832.
47. See BARBASH, LABOR'S GRASS ROOTS 170-96 (1961); SAYLES &
STRAUSS, THE LocAL UNION: ITS PLACE IN THE INDUSTRIAL PLANT 43-58
(1953).
48. In Branch v. Vickers, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 518 (E.D. Mich. 1962),
local members were denied the right to vote on a collective agreement
even though the right was granted under the union's constitution and
bylaws. A trusteeship had been imposed upon the union, defined by
§ 3(h) of the LMRDA as a method of supervision wherein the "autonomy otherwise available to a subordinate body under its constitution or
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tion under the Ragland approach since plaintiffs were not given
a right to vote and, more to the point, no other members were
given this right either. Is there any less a denial of rights
when particular members can vote than when no members can
vote? The infringement is present in both cases. In either
case, it is no consolation to the member harmed that others
similarly situated may have a right which he is denied.
If the section is solely an equal protection provision, then it
guarantees equal application of rights provided in union constitutions and bylaws, rather than by a federal statute, and permits
reasonable differentiation among members in regard to those specific rights. If the right has been denied to every union member, then there has been no invidious classification and, thus, no
denial of equal rights. The majority of lower courts have taken
this position.49 Thus, the section does not say that all members
have the right to participate in a union meeting, but only provides that if the right to participate is given, it must be given
to every member of the union. It is probably in this sense that
the Ragland court said the right must first exist before it
can be enforced.
To apply the section when all members are treated alike, on
the other hand, implies that the section creates external standards. In other words, the section grants the right to vote, for
example, even if the right is not granted in union laws and even
bylaws" is suspended. Thus, reasoned the court, members had no right
to participate in a referendum. Indeed, precedents would have permitted the court to say even a clear violation of the union's constitution
passes muster since no member voted on a referendum. Even if a right
existed, § 101 (a) (1) is inapplicable since there is no loss of equality.
Although the lack of classification might well have spelled plaintiff's
defeat in any case, the court's use of a statutory definition is open to
question. The statute does not say that every trusteeship suspends all of
a local's autonomy, although this is permissible in certain cases. Surely,
a union would be permitted to limit the loss of local autonomy. Thus,
the court should have discovered the degree of autonomy suspended in
this situation by a trusteeship. Indeed, since the reasons for imposing
a trusteeship are limited by statute, it would seem reasonable to permit
the loss of only those participatory rights which have been so abused
as to justify a trusteeship.
49. The emphasis of § 101 (a) (1) is "placed on the right of a member to enjoin violations of the Act where one member is granted the
right and another is denied it." McKeon v. Highway Truck Drivers, 223
F. Supp. 341, 342 (D. Del. 1963). See also Guarnaccia v. Kenin, 234 F.
Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Horn v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, 194 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Mich. 1961) (failure to allege a deprivation of equal rights). But see Young v. Hayes, 195 F. Supp. 911 (D.D.C.
1961); Allen v. Local 92, Iron Workers, 47 L.R.R.ML 2214 (N.D. Ala. 1960).
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Some courts,

however, have found violations of section 101 (a) (1) even though
all members of the local were treated alike. 51 By implication,
these courts have added the words "rights and" to the "equal
rights" phrase, thus protecting the rights mentioned in section
101 (a) (1) even though all members of the local suffer the same
infirmity. Under this approach, the section is really a grant of
rights rather than merely an equal protection provision, and no
classification scheme is necessary to create a violation of the
section.
In Young v. Hayes,52 the court granted an injunction restraining the union from putting into effect amendments to the
International constitution approved by the general membership.
The proposed amendments had been accompanied by a circular
which included a statement by the International's president to
the effect that the amendments were necessary because of the
LMRDA. The ballot was divided into Part 1, containing fortyseven amendments listed under Proposition Four, and Part TT,
consisting of 549 amendments separately listed for voting. As
to Part I, Proposition Four, plaintiff alleged that the membership was not afforded opportunity to vote upon each of the
forty-seven amendments separately as required by article 23,
53
section 4, of the International constitution.
Article 23, section 4, requires that a ballot be printed in the
50. One writer has assumed that this is obviously the proper interpretation of the statute. Rosenberg, Interpretive Problems of Title I of
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 16 IND. & LAB.
REL. REV. 405 (1963).
"Concern of Congress, however, was to insure
that certain rights be granted to all union members, not just to insure
equal treatment of all members." Id. at 408. But see Aaron, The Union
Member's 'Bill of Rights': First Two Years, 1 INn. REL. 47, 55 (1962);
Dunau, Some Comments on the Bill of Rights of Members of Labor
Organizations,N.Y.U. 14TH CONF. ON LABoR 77, 81 (1961).
51. See, e.g., Young v. Hayes, 195 F. Supp. 911 (D.D.C. 1961). Furthermore, courts have protected against infringements when only individual members were involved. Thus, § 101 (a) (1) was held to have
been violated where officers failed to keep order at a meeting in which
plaintiff had the floor, was invited to fight, and was threatened with
punishment. Allen v. Local 92, Iron Workers, 47 L.R.R.M. 2214 (N.D.
Ala. 1960). The court could justifiably have assumed, however, that all
members would not receive the same treatment.
52. 195 F. Supp. 911 (D.D.C. 1961).
53. Id. at 914-15. Plaintiffs also alleged that the delegates to the
convention, who had initially approved the amendments, were unaware
that the forty-seven amendments would not be submitted individually.
The report of the Committee on Law of the international prefaced the
body of the ballot by stating that several propositions had been grouped
"for the convenience of the membership."
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form of a referendum ballot and arranged in such a manner
that shall permit each subject to be voted upon separately.
The court, finding that more than one subject was included in
Proposition Four, stated that
the spirit, if not the exact wording of the Landrum-Griffin Act,
contained in the so-called Bill of Rights of Members of Labor
Organizations, section 101 (a) (1), would seem to require the submission of the amendments believed to be needed in order for
the Union to conform to the provisions of the Act, on a separate
amendment basis . . . or some other grouping less comprehensive than
trying to encompass the entire legislation in one propo54
sition.
The court also found that the use of the word "mandatory"
and "necessary" in the ballot's preface constituted an erroneous
interpretation of the LMRDA and imparted an almost forced
choice method of voting. For this reason alone the court considered the ballot not to be in accordance with the union's constitutional article 24, section 3: "compiled in the form of a ballot suitable for submission for the membership through the referendum."
The law used by the court is obviously the union law, but
the court interpreted union law to protect democratic interests.
By interpreting and enforcing the union bylaws, the court followed an approach used by state courts under the common law.
Section 101 (a) (1), however, does not empower federal courts to
enforce constitutional and bylaw provisions as such; rather, it
empowers courts to require equal application of certain specific
rights.
The court apparently agreed with other federal courts that
the rights enforced under section 101 (a) (1) arise from union
constitutional provisions or bylaws, if at all, and not from the
federal statute. By finding that section 101 (a) (1) was violated
in this case, however, the court interpreted the section to protect
the right to vote, rather than merely the equal right to vote.
The court veered sharply from the proposition that the section is
only applicable when there are invidious classifications.
One objection to this approach is the language itself: "every
member shall have equal rights." Congressional reference to
the section, although hardly illuminating, stresses the equal
rights phrase. Furthermore, if an affirmative grant of rights
were intended, section 101(a) (2) provides an appropriate model.
The difference in wording strongly suggests a difference in
meaning. There is some statutory overlap, as infringements
64.

195 F. Supp. at 915-16.
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of speech under section 101 (a) (2) may also infringe the section
101 (a) (1) right to "participate." But the sections are not completely coterminus. Limiting section 101 (a) (1) to equal rights
implies congressional design to provide significantly greater
protection to speech and assembly under section 101 (a) (2) than
to the rights to vote, nominate, and participate in meetings under
section 101 (a) (1). Why this should be so is unclear, and counsel
may be expected to attempt to broaden the scope of section 101
(a) (1) by stressing the limiting impact of literal interpretation.
Under an equal protection analysis the "reasonable rules
and regulations" clause does not permit restriction of the specific rights mentioned in the section. Rather, the clause permits
limitations on the equal rights obligations. The function of the
proviso is to permit some differentiation among members in certain situations. The proviso in section 101 (a) (2), on the other
hand, is a limitation on the rights themselves, because the section
grants substantive rights. Thus, the function of each proviso is
quite different. A plaintiff under either section may claim he
has been denied a right. To violate section 101(a) (1), other
members must possess that right; section 101 (a) (2) may be violated, however, even though all members are similarly affected.
The proviso in section 101 (a) (1) may require a greater burden of
proof to sustain a restrictive rule since, presumably, the right in
question is granted to some members and not others. Rationality depends upon the function served by the application of that
test in a particular situation. Thus, the scope of each "reasonable limitation" clause may not be the same.
In a sense, section 101 (a) (1) does create substantive rights.
Assume a bylaw which grants a specific right to A but denies
the right to B. Irrespective of whether the rule is reasonable,
there is clearly a denial of equal treatment. 55 The right denied
is in a sense a union right, a right given by the union to A.
However, the courts will probably require the union to give B
the same right that A has been given. Requiring equal application compels the union to expand the right or remove it alto55. Ragland, however, implies that there is no violation in this case
because B was never given a right; therefore, B could not be denied a
right. But this assumes that the action under § 101 (a) (1) is merely to
enforce the union constitution and bylaws, in other words, merely a
repetition of existing rights under the laws of nearly all states. However, it is clear that the section is aimed at more than merely enforcing
union bylaw provisions. The fact that the section assumes that some
bylaws will be struck down implies an extension from the common law
contract approach.
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gether. If it chooses the former, B in reality is granted a right
by section 101 (a) (1).
The Supreme Court has apparently put to rest the notion
that section 101 (a) (1) grants affirmative rights in addition to
equal protection. In Calhoun v. Harvey,57 the Supreme Court
was faced with a section 101 (a) (1) challenge to two union
rules: a self-nomination requirement and a rigorous eligibility
requirement for union office.58
The self-nomination rule fell well within the scope of the
rights protected by section 101 (a) (1), but the Court found that
the rule was not discriminatory. Thus, the question of the
rule's rationality was not raised. The Court held that the eligibility requirement could only be challenged under Title IV, if
at all, thus limiting the reach of section 101 (a) (1) in regard to
subjects clearly within its literal scope. The section guarantees
the right to nominate candidates, but the Court held that that
section did not give a right to nominate any person. Although
it would seem reasonable to argue that eligibility requirements
may infringe the right to nominate by severely limiting the class
of those who may be nominated, the Court decided on a more
simplistic interpretation.
In discussing the equal rights provisions, the Court said
that it is:
...

no more than a command that members and classes of

members shall not be discriminated against in their right to
nominate and vote. And Congress carefully prescribed that

even this right against discrimination is "subject to reasonable
rules and regulations" by the union. The complaining union
members here have been ... denied no privilege or right to...
nominate which the union has granted to others. They have indeed taken full advantage of the uniform rule limiting nominations by nominating themselves for office. It is true that they
were denied their request to be candidates, but that denial was
not a discrimination against their rights to nominate, since the
same qualifications were required equally of all members.
Whether the eligibility requirements set by the union's constitution and bylaws were reasonable and valid is a question separate and distinct from whether the right to nominate on an equal
basis given by § 101(a) (1) was violated.59

Thus, the section seems to apply only when rights are
57, 379 U.S. 134 (1964).
58. Self-nomination was the only manner in which a name could
be placed before the membership. The eligibility rule, enacted seven
months before the election, required that candidates for office, except
the president, must have belonged to the union for five years and served
180 or more days of sea duty in each of two years during the three-year
period before the election.
59. 379 U.S. at 139. (Emphasis added.)
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granted to some and denied to others, rather than when the
limitation applies to all members of the union. Yet, this
would provide a handy means to accomplish what would otherwise be done by "class" legislation. The Court assumed that the
self-nomination rule was possibly a limitation on the right to
nominate, but, because the rule applies to all members, there
was no violation of the section. Similarly, since all members
were faced with a proposal containing forty-seven amendments
in Young v. Hayes, no members were denied rights granted to
others.
However, the Court may have left the door slightly ajar for
future backtracking. Referring to the court of appeal's combination of the two rules to find a violation of section 102, the
Court stated that it did not agree that "jurisdiction under section
102 can be upheld by reliance in whole or in part on allegations
which in substance charge breach of Title IV rights." Of course,
the Court had to test the self-nomination rule by itself under
section 101 (a) (1), but its disagreement with the lower court and
its finding that the rule was not unreasonable may have had a
substantial impact upon the Court. Plaintiffs had used the
self-nomination rule, and no direct harm stemming from this
rule was apparently shown. The Court, furthermore, was dealing with the right to nominate, also protected by Title IV. It is
open to the Court to limit its decision in relation to the selfnomination rule to a holding that the right to nominate, since it
is also protected by Title IV, is deserving of less protection in a
Title I section than the rights granted exclusively by section
101 (a) (1).
A.

SCOPE OF SECTION 101 (a) (1) SPEECH An ASSE BLY

GUARANTEES
Assuming that section 101 (a) (1) guarantees equal treatment
as to certain basic rights under union law, the next inquiry
focuses on the scope of these rights. Even if unequal treatment is present, the denial must fall within the "rights" section
of the statute. The provisions can be narrowed almost to the
vanishing point by limiting plaintiff's claim to its precise factual
contours. In Horn v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Ry. Employees,6" for instance, plaintiff alleged that the union accepted
or caused a change of seniority provisions in an existing bargaining agreement without membership approval, that the union
60. 194 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
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concealed this fact at a subsequent meeting when a vote was
taken to ratify such change, and the union misled the members as to the import and effect of the proposition voted upon.
In denying the claim, the court noted that the plaintiff did not
allege a deprivation of equal rights and also failed to allege
any specific rights granted by the section. Although the holding
could have been limited to pleading deficiencies, the court went
further to hold that the acts did not violate a right specifically
set forth in the statute. It would seem, however, that an allegation that officers misled voters as to the effect of a proposal
would be sufficient to allege a denial of the right to vote.
The right to vote is empty indeed if members do not know what
they are voting upon. Again, a court has added gratuitous statements which have the effect of limiting the statute.61
A broader view of the statute was taken in Young v. Hayes,
already discussed in relation to the classification question. The
district court found the right to vote violated when forty-seven
amendments were grouped under one proposition for voting.
Interestingly, the court referred primarily to the union's constitution, rather than the statute. Plaintiffs' claim was very similar
to that in Horn: members were confused or misled and, because of that, their right to vote was infringed. Although the
court referred to the "spirit, if not the exact wording of the
Landrum-Griffin Act," it seems clear that serious misrepresentation can infringe a member's right to vote. In Young, the
misleading nature of the ballot "imparted an almost forced
choice method of voting." Although the court found that the
union had not complied with its constitution, it did add that the
right to vote extended in the act is not a mere naked right to
cast a ballot. Thus, the court relies to some extent on the
statute which gives it jurisdiction.
The niggardly interpretation of Title I given by many federal
courts is interesting in light of congressional concern. Principles of autonomy and self-regulation which restrained the
hand of state courts for so long have received great deference
by federal courts despite clear statements of public policy in the
statute. Although Congress was indeed concerned with minimum intervention into union affairs, institutional interests were
recognized in sections 101 (a) (1) and 101 (a) (2). Institutional
interests are overemphasized, however, when employed to limit
61. Note that the alleged infringement of rights affected each
member of the union, thereby removing the action from the scope of
§ 101 (a) (1) because no classification was involved.
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the scope of the rights granted. Indeed, before the court tests
the rationality of the restriction under the "reasonable rules"
clause, plaintiff must hurdle imposing obstacles: the denial of a
101 (a) (1) right must involve a classification scheme.
Even if a court does consider the rationality of a union's
restrictive rule, interpretative issues pose uncomfortable problems. Assume a member has been rebuffed in his attempt to
place a motion before the membership. Without more, a prima
facie case would seem established that his right to participate
has been denied.6 2 Rules of order are "reasonable rules," but
the framework of analysis is not clear. Is it sufficient that all
men would agree that rule XX is reasonable in the sense that it
is necessary for the maintenance of order at meetings? If analysis progressed no further, the court would uphold the institutional interests represented by reasonable rule XX. This approach, however, ignores the conflict of interest which may be
present in the situation by judging the rule's rationality in the
abstract. Suppose the member has had no other opportunity
during the meeting to obtain the floor because the agenda has
been stacked? This could violate section 101 (a) (1) in a particular case.
The important point is that a literal meaning of section
101 (a) (1) provides no opportunity to balance legitimate union
interests against individual interests. Individual interests are
not of great significance if their only operational value is to place
a burden on the union to show that valid institutional interests
are represented by the restricting rule. Congressional purpose
would seem to dictate that a finding that a rule is reasonable
in the abstract be followed by an inquiry into the reasonableness
of the rule's application to plaintiff's conduct. Thus, the context
in which plaintiff's conduct occurred, the nature of his remarks
or actions, and other opportunities for expression should be considered. Although such an approach is neither novel nor radical,
the necessity to state the proposition demonstrates the lack of
congressional care taken in drafting the act.
B.

ENFORCING THE UNIoN's CONsTITUTION Am BYLAwS

Common law courts generally assumed that the union's constitution and bylaws formed a contract between the union and
62. Most courts require more. Plaintiff must allege that an equal
right was infringed and, apparently, that no reasonable rule barred his
motion.
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the member. 63 Although the contract was one of adhesion at
best, the formula permitted the courts to enforce the union's own
rules, thus minimizing judicial interference. Official action
might be declared invalid because it was inconsistent with the
union's constitution or bylaws. Although some rules were struck
down as inconsistent with natural justice or public policy, the
contract approach restrained courts from openly declaring and
protecting substantive rights. Congress chose a different path,
however. Whether an officer could validly impose a restriction
under the union's own rules was not critical. If a restriction
is imposed, section 101 (a) (1) requires it to be uniformly imposed. Even the affirmative grant of specific rights in section
101 (a) (2) operates whether or not the challenged restriction is
a reasonable interpretation of the union law.
A number of federal courts, however, have assumed the
power to interpret and enforce a union's constitution and bylaws
under section 101 (a) (1). One case will perhaps be sufficient to
illustrate. Vestal v. International Bhd. of Teamsters64 arose
from an internal dispute stemming from work-oriented interests.
Out of approximately 5,000 members in Local 327, 2,100 are employed in the freight industry. A petition requesting a separate
charter for freighters was received by the General Executive
Board of the International in March, 1965. The Board directed
that a mail referendum be conducted among the freighters.
Plaintiffs, nonfreighter officers and members of the local, challenged the decision to limit the referendum to freighters. President Hoffa replied that since the Board could issue a charter
without a referendum, there could surely be no objection if those
directly concerned made the decision. When the Board rejected the appeal, plaintiffs instituted an action in the federal
court alleging an infringement of their equal right to vote.
Meanwhile, the referendum was held, and freighters favored a
separate charter by a three-to-one margin.
Since an election was held, 5 and all members could not
participate, the resulting lack of equality would seem to involve
101(a) (1). The serious question would revolve around the reasonableness of the decision to limit the vote. Absolute equality
63. Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do
in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 179 (1960).
64. 245 F. Supp. 623 (M.D. Tenn. 1965).
65. Although the election had been held, Title IV did not preempt
this action. This Title, providing for complaints to the Secretary of
Labor as the exclusive remedy after an election, applies only to the
election of officers.
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in this context might well deny the minority freighters the right
to be represented by officers reflecting their narrow job interests. Since it would be reasonable to permit only freighters
0
to vote on a collective bargaining contract affecting them,G
it
would seem reasonable to limit a question of representation to

those to be represented. As in local government annexation,
however, the entity which stands to lose area or taxpayers also
has an interest in the outcome of the referendum.

The court,

obviously sympathetic to nonfreighters, stated that the proposal
"vitally affects [the union's] structure, its size and strength
and its bargaining power." The conflict of interests suggests that
at a minimum either the actual decision or a decision that the
entire membership should vote on the question would be reasonable. Legitimate interests are adversely affected under either
approach.
The executive body's decision, however, was not a rule by
itself. Assuming the right to vote guaranteed by 101 (a) (1) is
involved, a limitation must be reasonable and be found in the
union's constitution or bylaws. The decision that only members
who would be covered by the separate charter could vote was
based upon the union president's interpretation of article 6,
section I (h), of the International's constitution:
The General President shall have the authority at his discretion to direct that a referendum vote or a vote by membership
in meetings assembled, be held by the membership of any Local
Union or subordinate body on any matter, issue or proposition
when, in his opinion, the welfare of the membership, the subordinate body, the Local Union, or the International Union, will
be served thereby.67
The vast amount of power and discretion given to the executive is a startling but common phenomenon. 68 In any event, a
rule existed under which the president reached his decision.
The court, however, turned the question of the reasonableness
of the limitation on the right to vote into the question of whether
the executive's interpretationwas a reasonable one.
The two questions are not the same. A reasonable interpretation of a constitutional provision might nevertheless result in
the infringement of protected rights. Even though a provision
clearly supported the limited vote decision, the reasonableness
of that limitation would have to be determined by the court
under section 101 (a) (1). Conversely, an unreasonable interpre66.

Cox,

LAW AND NATIONAL LABOR POLICY

102 (1960).

67. 245 F. Supp. at 626. (Emphasis added.)
68. Article 6, § 2(a), gives the president the authority to interpret
the constitution.
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tation might not infringe the right to vote. Assuming the president is clearly in error, the right of nonfreighters to vote under
section 101 (a) (1) is not necessarily infringed. 9 The question of
deprivation of protected rights, then, is independent of the propriety of an official's interpretation of applicable law.
The court's approach, however, does not necessarily violate
congressional concern for minimal interference, for state courts
have long had the power to interpret union law.7 0 The danger in this situation is that federal courts will stray from their
71
proper function under the act.
The opinion in Vestal demonstrates that the danger is not
hypothetical. The court stated that its role was merely to determine if the general president's interpretation was reasonable.
If it was, the court would not substitute an interpretation of its
own. Without boundaries on the court's ability to determine
reasonableness, however, it would seem difficult to prevent just
such a substitution.
The court found that "by the membership" meant nothing
other than a vote of the entire membership. 72 The court's
finding is stated as an obvious fact. It is not obvious, however.
In a sense the court had read "by the membership" as "by the
entire membership," rather than "by the directly concerned
membership." Principles of construction would suggest that
since a primary purpose of the provision is to promote selfdetermination, that purpose may be better served by the president's interpretation. Moreover, although the equation that
"membership" equals "entire membership" seems reasonable, the
language does not foreclose the president's interpretation as also
69. The reasonableness of an interpretation of union law, even if
a proper inquiry, can only properly be before the court in a narrow
range of cases. The reasonableness of a bylaw interpretation holding
that Jones may not receive strike pay, for instance, cannot be reviewed
under § 101(a) (1) because none of the specified rights granted by that
section is involved. Of course, the section would be violated if the
denial was actually punishment for the exercise of a Title I right.
70. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 63, at 178-87 (1960).
71. Thus, in a case where plaintiff charged that he was unable to
have a motion placed before the membership, the court found that the
decision of the chair holding the motion out of order was based on a reasonable interpretation of union laws. McFarland v. Teamsters Union,
180 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). The determination that the interpretation was reasonable, however, does not answer the statutory question.
72. The court also held that freighters were not a subordinate body
because that phrase in other provisions refers only to a formally "chartered body directly subordinate to the International Union, such as a
Joint Council or a Conference." 245 F. Supp. at 627.
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being reasonable. The defendants would seem to have met
their judicially imposed burden of showing that their view is
reasonable.7 3 The court need not find the correct interpretation. Indeed, this task could well be impossible. In Vestal, for
instance, the court treated the union's past practice lightly,
surely a guide to reasonableness. Moreover, there is probably
no legislative history in the statutory sense. Thus, the court
does not have the tools to complete the task it set for itself.
The criticism only strengthens the belief that the court did
not choose the proper task. The court held that since the president's interpretation was "clearly unreasonable, we need not
consider whether, if the interpretation were reasonable, a constitutional provision authorizing a referendum limited to freighters would be a reasonable rule or regulation." But the latter
determination is the one required by the statute! A violation
of union law, assuming the court is correct, does not necessarily
violate section 101 (a) (1). The court's jurisdiction is based upon
section 102 which grants a federal cause of action when Title I
rights are infringed. The court does find that nonfreighters
have been denied rights, but the reason is that such a limitation,
since unauthorized by the union's constitution or bylaws, constitutes "a clear violation" of section 101 (a) (1). If plaintiffs' equal
right to vote is violated, however, it is violated even though
such action is clearly authorized.
Criticism of the result reached is less serious than doubts
about the avenue traveled. The court has erroneously assumed
that section 101 (a) (1) grants a general power to determine
whether interpretations of union law are reasonable. The
court's holding voids a self-determination election by those directly interested.- Since the court declined to face the statutory
question, plaintiffs might well have to bring another suit to
finally end the dispute. Indeed, the court states that the International constitution might well give the executive the power
to issue a separate charter without conducting a vote. Since no
73. What may be reasonable in a court of law may take on a far
different coloration outside the court. Local 327 is an anti-administration local and has recently urged that Teamster President Hoffa's bond
in his jury tampering case be revoked. Five members of Local 327 have
filed suit against Hoffa charging him with "harassing and threatening
the local in an effort to obtain a new trial of his 1964 jury tamper case."
Washington Post, Aug. 17, 1966, p. 3, col. 1. As harassment, the president of the local lists "splitting Local 327 with freight workers forming
Local 480 in Nashville." Financial records of the local have recently
been stolen under mysterious circumstances. N.Y. Times, Aug. 24,
1966, p. 29, col. 2.
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one would be given a vote in this situation, most courts would
hold plaintiffs' equal right to vote was not infringed.
The power to interpret union constitutions permits a substantial amount of intervention into internal affairs of the union
behind the cool mask of legislative interpretation. Such an approach is most useful to state courts because of reluctance to
explicitly set substantive standards. Congress has provided
substantive standards, however, and it would seem preferable
for federal courts to apply those standards. 4
Unfortunately, the problem is not as one-sided as presented
above. Officers should not be able to penalize conduct by provisions which seem obviously inapplicable. Of course, the limitation may not be a reasonable restriction, or the conduct may
be the type which is protected in any case. However, a range
of situations does exist where an inapplicable provision could be
employed to limit speech which could be limited by a proper
provision. The following example is illustrative. Member Bluster disrupts a membership meeting by shouting, speaking at will
and out of turn, and acting generally nasty. Surely Robert's
Rules of Order would come to the rescue in this situation, permitting the chair to silence or pacify Bluster with an arsenal of
polite weapons. But what if the union has failed to adopt rules
of order? If Bluster is silenced, has his equal right to participate
been infringed? Suppose that in court the presiding officer,
now a defendant, justifies the removal of Bluster from the meeting by referring to a rule relating to the public disclosure of
union secrets. Barring an ingenious explanation, the rule obviously does not apply. Of course, the court may find that
Bluster's conduct was not protected by the act in any event, as
his conduct went beyond participatory conduct. Thus, even if
others were permitted to act in a similar fashion, or even if
section 101 (a) (1) were read to grant the affirmative right to
participate, no right has been infringed. Similarly, under section 101 (a) (2) 's right of free speech, the court could hold that
Bluster's speech was not within free speech, and, therefore, the
proviso is not relevant. However, decisions indicate the speech
74. Were Vestal the only opinion seeking to avoid the statute's
thrust by asking a threshold question, the problem would not be serious.
Other courts, however, have assumed the same prerogative. See Gurton
v. Arons, 339 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1964). See also McFarland v. Teamsters
Union, 180 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). In neither of these cases, however, has the court's standard of reasonableness been as high as in Vestal.
See also Young v. Hayes, 195 F. Supp. 911 (D.D.C. 1961), where the court
stresses § 101(a) (1), and a violation of union procedures.
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guarantee is to be read broadly, and limitation, if at all, must
be justified under the proviso of section 101(a)(2). 71 Thus,
even section 101 (a) (2) raises the "inapplicable provision" dilemma. Excluding the equal rights problems for the moment, and
assuming Bluster's conduct falls within the broad ambit of protection afforded by the statute, discipline can only be justified
by an established union rule.
All this, of course, was merely a pedagogical digression to
illuminate the Vestal question in a new light. The situation in
which an official's interpretation of union law is debatable or
dubious shades into the situation in which the interpretation is
pure fantasy because the provision relied upon obviously does
not apply to the member's conduct.
Two alternatives seem to be presented. The court could ignore the applicability of a provision, and exclusively analyze
whether a limitation was reasonable in that situation. The rea-'
sonableness of the limitation will surely depend on the importance of the individual interest involved. Thus, it could be argued, a finding in favor of discipline would not offend justice.
The plaintiff, however, would seem justified in arguing that
section 101 (a) (2), for instance, permits all speech unless limited
by a rule which falls within the proviso. This right cannot be
restricted, either by an unreasonable rule or an inapplicable
rule. Since an inapplicable rule does not represent the institutional interests justifying restriction, and Congress has required
that these interests be spelled out in a rule or regulation, the
application of this kind of rule is not reasonable.
Reasonableness does not depend on any abstract standard of
propriety, but includes a balancing of conflicting interests. A
rule reasonable on its face must nevertheless be reasonable in
application. A reasonably applied rule must be a rule designed
to deal with the situation, thus reflecting certain institutional
interests.
The argument seems overwhelming, suggesting another approach. Perhaps the court should look at the proposed limiting
provision only to determine if it can plausibly be applied to the
facts. This limited review would seam warranted in the interest
of permitting members to be fairly warned of the boundaries of
75. Farowitz v. Associated Musicians, 330 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1964);
Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1963). Such holdings eliminate the complexities of what Professor Kalven calls the "two-level"
theory of speech. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The
Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 217.
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permissible activity. As mentioned above, courts would normally find it difficult to determine if a rule applied because of
lack of information. Thus, no union rule exists permitting discipline for Bluster's conduct, no matter how reprehensible it
may be. In Vestal, however, the scope of suffrage was based
upon the proper provision, and the reasonableness of the interpretation of that provision is not relevant to the section 101(a)
(1) inquiry.
In conclusion, then, the court's power to require that limiting provisions apply to the conduct receiving discipline or that
interpretations of these provisions be reasonable, may well be
implied. The danger is that this threshhold step will lead courts
away from the proper statutory determinations. For instance, a
court may find an interpretation reasonable without continuing
to the next question-has the statute nevertheless been violated?
Perhaps the two situations can be satisfactorily treated in different ways. In Vestal, there was no real question of applicability; the constitutional provision related to the problem of
the scope of a referendum, and interpretation of the section
could not lead to discipline. Thus, deference should be accorded
the official interpretation. In disciplinary cases, on the other
hand, problems of notice and abuse of authority are more serious.
Members should know what possible sanctions exist and should
not have to fear sham proceedings.
Perhaps the problem should be handled in a different way.
Plaintiff's argument that the offense provision with which he
has been charged is inapplicable basically avers an infringement
of procedural rights and perhaps section 101(a)(5)7 6 provides
another solution. State courts have voided disciplinary proceedings on the ground that challenged conduct could not conceivably fall within the offense provision. Such a holding, of
course, involves an inquiry into the facts, and some courts have
frankly stated that no evidence, or insufficient evidence, was
introduced to place conduct within the offense. Section 101(a)
(5)'s protection of a full and fair hearing should be read to
guarantee at least a minimal review of union trial proceedings.
Some evidence to support the union trial board's findings of
fact should be required, and the facts as found should plausibly
fall within the union offense provision. If the procedure fol76.

"No member of any labor organization may be fined.... ex-

pelled, or otherwise disciplined . . .unless such member has been (A)

served with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to
prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing." 73 Stat. 522
(1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (5) (1964).
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lowed satisfies section 101 (a) (5), including some standard of applicability of offense provisions, the court should face the substantive question squarely.
IV. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY
UNDER SECTION 101 (a) (2)
On first impression, section 101 (a) (2) appears to be a
straightforward grant of rights. 77 Yet, the grant of rights is
stated in broad terms, and the structure of the provision creates
internal puzzles. Structurally, the section is divided into four
parts consisting of three provisions granting rights, and an overall proviso. Union members are given the right to:
1. Meet and assemble freely with other members.
2. Express any views, arguments or opinions.
3. Express at meetings of the labor organization their views,
upon candidates in an election or upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to established reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings.
The above rights are limited by a proviso permitting unions
to adopt reasonable rules relating to the "responsibility of every
member toward the organization as an institution and to his
refraining from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal and contractual obligations."
The most obvious question involves the scope of the guarantees in relation to the valid institutional interests recognized by
the proviso. Less obvious and wide-sweeping, however, are a
number of perplexing problems lurking in the background.
Questions arise as to the scope of the granted rights exclusive
of the proviso. The first-mentioned right, for instance, grants a
seemingly absolute right of assembly. The language, however,
would seem to exclude meeting with nonmembers of the union.
The presence of some union members, however, should afford
77. Every member of any labor organization shall have the
right to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to
express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at
meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates
in an election of the labor organization or upon any business
properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of
meetings: Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed to
impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce
reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member
toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining
from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its
legal or contractual obligations.
73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. &411(a) (2) (1964).
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protection despite the presence of nonmembers. 78 However, suppose the group substantially or exclusively consists of nonmembers. Since the rights are given to protect democratic activity
within the union, should a member have a right to discuss union
79
problems with nonunion members?
Union plans, if made public, may substantially weaken a
union's bargaining position in the thrust and parry of labormanagement relations. Furthermore, since the right of assembly
is considered indispensible to the creation of political groups
within unions, a desideratum of Congress, members may be on
weak ground in justifying the presence of nonmembers under
section 101 (a) (2). Thus, the members' interest in relation to
the statute's purpose is relatively weak, while the union's interest may be relatively strong.
It is precisely this balancing of individual interests and institutional interests, however, which should be considered under
the proviso. The language of the act rather forcibly suggests
that the balance in relation to this question has already been
made. The interest in institutional security, can be said to have
outweighed the interest in a broader right of assembly. A strict
rule also forecloses questions of the propriety of the application
of union sanctions when varying numbers of nonmembers are
present, thus simplifying the administration of the act.
In contrast to the assembly provision, the expression of
views provision is stated in absolute terms. Legislative history
indicates that the purpose of this broad statement was to guarantee expression in nonunion forums. 80 This differentiation
78. In Johnson v. Local 58, IBEW, 185 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich.
1960), a group of union members joined by nonmembers, sought to persuade the international to grant them a local charter covering a geographical area which overlapped that of Local 58. Plaintiff alleged that
defendants threatened their job rights and disturbed their meetings. A
motion to dismiss on a number of grounds was denied. Whether the
presence of nonmembers foreclosed the protection of §_ 101(a) (2) was
either not raised or rejected without comment.
79. See S-Vankin, Union Disciplinary Powers and Procedures, 86
MoNnmY LABOR REV. 125, 130 (1963).
See generally Bromwich, Union
Constitutions,FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC REPORT 29-35 (1959).
Members may have substantial interest, however, in meeting with
nonunion members of the bargaining unit. Such action may lead to the
filing of a decertification petition. Although the NLRA protects this
conduct, the protection does not extend to union expulsion. See text
accompanying notes 235-44 infra. Thus, neither the LMRDA nor the
NLRA protects assembly with nonmembers.
80. Originally, commas followed the words "members" and "opinions." A semicolon after "members" was added from the floor of the
Senate. 2 LEG. IST. 1230. This change was described as "clerical."
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among forums suggests that the limitation in the assembly provision may be nonoperational. A permissible sanction in regard to the assembly provision would seem to violate the
broader speech provision. Thus, the union may charge a member
with disclosure of union secrets or dual unionism in a meeting
with nonmembers without necessarily violating the assembly
provision. The charge, however, may infringe the guarantee of
free speech by punishing the exercise of that right in a particular forum.
The problem would be avoided, of course, by limiting the
broad speech provision by the narrower assembly guarantee.
Thus, although speech in relation to topics of union interest is
generally protected, it will not be protected when uttered at a
meeting which is outside the perimeter of the assembly provision. If the speech provision is not limited by the assembly
provision, then the limitation "with other members" becomes in
reality surplusage. Such a lawyer's gambit seems reasonable,
however, only if congressional concern that the speech provision
be extremely broad is overlooked. Senator Goldwater, for instance, was adamant that speech be protected in all forums, and
the insertion of the semicolon after "opinions" strongly suggests
that Congress accepted this concern.8 ' Senator Cooper rose to
ask whether it was proper to assume the purpose of the amendment was "to assure . . . that the constitutional safeguards of
free speech shall be preserved outside the union hall." Senator
McClellan replied, and Senator Kuchel agreed, that "the purpose is to make certain that union members shall have freedom
of speech not only in a union hall, but outside. '8 2 The dilemma
cannot be avoided by permitting union disciplinary proceedings
relating to assembly, such as dual unionism, but not speech,
such as libel or disclosure. These offenses usually consist of
speech and assembly, and it would be impossible to separate the
speech and assembly aspects of each offense.
Subsequently, Senator McClellan indicated that the semicolon had been
misplaced and received unanimous consent to place it after the word
"opinions" instead of after the word "members." Id. at 1234. Inserting
a semicolon after the word "members" could give rise to the argument
that the expression of opinion, unlike assembly, was protected whatever
the composition of the audience. However, when the semicolon was
shifted to the end of the word "opinions," combining the first two rights
in one expression, the communication protected by the act was impliedly
limited to other union members. The double use of semicolons first
appeared in the ultimately approved Landrum-Griffin Bill, H.R. 8400,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
81.

See 2 LEG. HIST. 1236, 1270, 1280,

8_. Id, at 1230,
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In light of the expressed concern with free speech, creating a
presumption in favor of a rights oriented interpretation of Title

I, the most practical solution would be to ignore the "members"
limitation of the assembly provision. As mentioned earlier, niceties of statutory interpretation may have to give way to general
congressional purpose because of the lack of precise draftsman83
ship.
Of course, speech falling within the grant of free speech
may in a proper situation be limited by the operation of the
proviso. The problem here, however, is whether a particular
type of speech or assembly is outside the grant itself. If so,
the statute provides no bar to disciplinary action for such conduct. Such a result argues for an inclusive reading of the grant
of rights, permitting unions to apply limiting regulations when
reasonable under the proviso. Excluding activity from the grant
of rights eliminates federal scrutiny of the application of substantive offenses for speech and assembly. Yet, it is important to repeat that a member's interest in speaking to nonunion
members may not be statutorily significant, since Congress was
primarily concerned with making intraunion political activity
possible. A member's interest in speaking to nonunion groups,
meeting with nonmembers, and writing to or for magazines and
papers is less significant than direct intraunion activity.

A. THE RiaHT OF ASSEMmLY
A question which has not received adequate attention involves the right of assembly in union meetings. Congress correctly assumed that the right to meet informally was essential
for the creation of opposition groups and that punishment for
such activity was common. 4 Yet, the right of assembly argu83. In Graham v. Soloner, 220 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1963), plaintiffs were charged with picketing union offices and displaying signs con-

taining disparaging remarks of specific officers. The court rejected
defendant's contention that the act protected speech among union members only, stating that "to demand confinement of such criticism within
the meeting-room walls would, or could, rob it of vitality and efficacy."
Id. at 714. For a companion case, see Gartner v. Soloner, 220 F. Supp.
115 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
84. The right of an opposition group within the union to organize,
to raise necessary funds, and to reach the union membership with a
program of action was rarely recognized in most union constitutions.
See Seidman, Lecture Sponsored by the Institute of Industrial Relations,
University of Michigan-Wayne State, 47 L.R.R.M. 63 (1960). Out of
ninety-three union constitutions studied in 1959, covering a combined
membership of more than seventeen million workers, only two unions,
the Ladies Garment Workers and the Typographical Union, explicitly
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ably includes a member's right to attend meetings, to have meetings called when scheduled, and to have special meetings called
according to procedures set out in the union's constitution or
bylaws.8 5
Section 101 (a) (1) protects the equal right to attend and participate in membership meetings. Thus, a member may not be
physically barred from a meeting or arbitrarily prevented from
speaking or offering motions at the meeting. Suppose members
are prevented from meeting at a normal meeting time, e.g., the
union hall is locked, officers do not appear, or officers do not
even schedule a meeting. Such tactics may be employed before
an election, for instance, to head off adverse criticism from the
floor. The classification question arises again-since all members are denied the opportunity to meet, no one has been denied
an equal right to meet. Assuming this is the proper interpretation of that section, does this situation fall under the umbrella of
the broader section, 101 (a) (2)? Since the two sections clearly
overlap, there is no need to specially justify inclusion of activity under 101 (a) (2).
Congress desired to protect assembly outside meetings, but
there is nothing to suggest that the assembly provision was designed exclusively for unofficial meetings. Again, the wording
of the statute may suggest a narrow approach. Speech and assembly are protected in fairly broad terms; speech in meetings
is limited to rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings. Since
freedom of speech is divided into a meeting and a nonmeeting
context, it is possible to argue that the assembly provision refers only to unofficial meetings.
A narrow reading of the provision, however, jeopardizes important rights. If meetings are not called, the right to attend,
participate, and express views given in both sections becomes
meaningless. Although the administration may not arbitrarily
muzzle a member wishing to call officers to account from the
meeting floor, the objective could conceivably be obtained simply by not calling the meeting.
permitted internal opposition groups to function. Only these two unions,
plus the Upholsterers, recognized the right of union members or candidates for union offices to issue political material without censorship or
punishment.
85. Cox suggests that assembly means meeting for the purpose of
organizing the opposition. This is clearly essential for the formation of
effective opposition groups. Whether the author feels this represents
the extent of the statutory right is unclear. See Cox, Internal Affairs of
Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MIcH. L. REv. 819,
834 (1960).
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In most cases the question will be whether the court can
enforce union constitutional provisions or bylaws relating to
meetings under the statute. Conduct mentioned above would
normally violate the union's constitution or bylaws. Since section 101 (a) (1) accepts union provisions as a source of substantive rights, and enforces equal application of particular rights,
it would not be unreasonable to consider section 101 (a) (2) as creating two sources of rights-one arising solely from the statute
and one arising from union law. The section, however, does
not specifically refer to rights stemming from union law. This
suggests that the federal rights granted do not include the enforcement of rights provided by union constitutions and bylaws.
Section 103, furthermore, guarantees retention of all rights under
union constitutions and bylaws, expressly preserving enforcement of union constitutions and bylaws in state courts. Yet,
section 103 refers to all of Title I, including section 101 (a) (1),
which in a sense makes union laws a source of federal rights.
Even if union rights as such are not protected under the statute,
however, abridgement of union rights may nevertheless constitute a violation of section 101 (a) (2) rights.86
The problem is not hypothetical. In 1960, twenty-four employees of a division of Hooker Chemical Corporation in North
Tonawanda, New York, were discharged for participation in a
strike which allegedly violated a no-strike clause. The dismissals were upheld by a tripartite arbitration panel. Under New
York law, a union may petition to set aside an arbitration decision if it acts within ninety days. Plaintiffs, believing they had
valid grounds to set aside the decision, took steps to have a
proceeding commenced for this purpose. When the president of
the local refused to take action, plaintiffs, pursuant to the union
constitution, obtained a sufficient number of signatures on a petition calling for a special meeting. The union president again
refused to call a meeting, although the union constitution arguably gives the president no discretion when proper procedures
have been followed.87 Time was of the essence; a special meet86. This approach would not be inconsistent with the previously
stated argument that a general power to interpret and enforce union
constitutional provisions and bylaws was not granted. Although the
argument here would permit the enforcement of union rights, the analysis stems from the rights granted by the act. Whether provisions of
union law may be interpreted and enforced outside of the rights granted
by the act is a different question.
87. Nearly all unions provide for the calling of special meetings.
The majority specify who may initiate the calling of a meeting. In a
substantial number of unions, no provision is made for special meetings
called by the membership. BARBASH, LABoR's GRASS RooTs 31-32 (1961).
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hag was required if plaintiffs were to present their case before
the membership. Although political action was not involved, it
is not difficult to imagine a situation in which a meeting might
be required to further the interest of an opposition group.
In rejecting plaintiffs' claim under section 101 (a) (2), the district court found that the division of freedom of speech into a
meeting and a nonmeeting context implied that the right of
assembly referred only to assembly outside of regular or special
meetings. 8 The court thus interpreted the right of assembly as
a "parallel or corresponding right to free speech."8 9 Why the
court implies a narrow assembly provision from the two speech
clauses is unclear. A more reasonable implication is that the
single assembly provision covers official as well as unofficial
meetings. Not only is the court's statutory interpretation dubious, but no policy appears to justify the narrow interpretation.
All unions hold their meetings within the framework of
their constitutions. Membership meetings serve a number of
functions. Members see meetings as a forum for decision making
and a channel in which information is funneled from the top.90
More significant here, however, is the potential for upward communication. The union meeting is a member's forum for raising
and airing grievances, and, except for election, meetings provide
the most effective forum for challenging official policies or conduct.91

The right to meet and assemble freely certainly should not
be limited to regularly scheduled meetings. When time is of
the essence, as it was in this case, special meetings are critical
to guarantee democratic rights and procedures. The right to
meet should not mean simply that union members may meet
with other members, but should include the right of assembly
guaranteed by the union's own constitution. To include the
right to attend regular or special meetings under section 101
(a) (2) would not seem to stretch the language of that provision
unreasonably. Legislative history is of little assistance except
for relatively clear evidence that Congress was primarily concerned with unofficial meetings. Since the court would merely
88. Yanity v. IAM, Civil No. 9440, W.D.N.Y., Dec. 31, 1962.
89. Quoted from counsel's copy of opinion.
90. See RosEN & RosEN, THE U -oN MEMBER SPEAxs 31-36 (1955).
91. This ideal role of the meeting may not be realized in practice.
Union members often lack political acumen, knowledge of parliamentary procedure, and self-assurance, all necessary to make meetings a
forum for registering grievances. See LrrsET, TRow & COLEMAN, UNiON
DEMOCRACY 11-13 (1956); SAYLES & SmAuss, THE LocAL UNioN: ITS
PLACE IN THE INDUSTRAL PLANT 181 (1963).
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own constitution, there is
be requiring the union to abide by its
92
no problem of overextending the act.
If union officers, in an attempt to prevent plaintiffs from
raising the arbitration question, prevented plaintiffs from attending a meeting or from speaking at a meeting, there would
be no question that plaintiffs' rights under the federal statute
would be violated. When time is of the essence, the effect of a
refusal to call a special meeting is really indistinguishable.
The assembly provision, which is not limited by its own
terms, should not be read in an analogous fashion to the speech
provision. Certainly, some form of speech would be improper
inside a meeting and it is for this reason the section permits the
union to establish reasonable rules for the conduct of meetings.
But, within those rules, members may still speak. Rules which
create a total ban on speech are probably not reasonable rules.
In this case, however, no meeting was called and no question of
orderly meetings was involved.
The narrow and broad rights of free speech in section 101
(a) (2) stem from an attempt to insure that union members have
freedom of speech outside the union hall as well as inside.9 3
Nothing in the section's structure suggests that the right to
meet outside of regular meetings is protected, but the right to
meet at regularly scheduled meetings or special meetings is not.
The reasons for separating speech into union and nonunion
forums are simply not applicable to any reasoned distinction between official and unofficial union meetings.
Thus, the parallel breaks down. The scope of freedom of
speech may well depend upon the forum or context. However,
the right to assembly is crucial because it itself creates the forum
or context. Indeed, the right of free speech at meetings would
be meaningless if union officers could arbitrarily decide not to
hold a meeting or to exclude certain members from attendance.
Neither of these two situations is explicitly protected by the
section; however, it is difficult to argue that they should not be
92. I have taken this position in the appeal brief in the Yanity
case. Although I feel objectivity and advocacy coincide on this issue,
readers should be aware of the potential conflict.
93. The Senate's analysis of the section is that the assembly provision protected the right both "in and out of union meetings." 1 LEG.
HIST. 949. Thus, the purpose of the semicolon after "opinions" is to
make certain that speech outside of union meetings is protected. See
Rothman, Legislative History of the "Bill of Rights" for Union Members,
45 MfN.. L. REV. 199, 211 (1960); Sherman, The Individual Member and
the Union: The Bill of Rights in the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1960, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 803, 818 (1960).
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protected by the section. 94
Two basically different situations can arise in which the
suggested interpretation could be applied. In the case discussed
above, the question was whether the statutory right extended to
cover a violation of the union constitution. The danger of overextension is not present because the court is merely requiring
compliance with the union's own law, not applying an abstract,
external standard. Thus, the danger of federal interference, recognized by Congress, would be minimal. 5 The approach presented here would not necessarily make union constitutions a
source of rights. Rather, the right of assembly would be read
to cover official as well as unofficial assemblages.
Danger arises if the statute is read to cover assembly rights
outside of union constitutional provisions or bylaws, however.
If no procedure exists for calling or scheduling required meetings, or if scheduled meetings are far apart, can section'101(a)
(2) provide a right to have meetings called? The application of
any external standard interferes to some extent with self-regulation and administration, yet section 101 (a) (2) is a grant 6f
tights creating external standards. Questions of when meetings
should be called and the reasonableness of periods between meetings should only be judicial questions in extreme cases for the
statute provides no real guidelines. Thus, courts should be
wary of extending the assembly right in regard to official meet-ings beyond union constitutional provisions and bylaws. "6

94. The district court also found that the president's act was merely
a technical violation of the union constitution. However, the special
meeting was the only way the member could raise a critical question,
the correctness of an arbitration decision.
95. State courts have traditionally enforced provisions of -union
laws by analogizing union constitutions and bylaws to contracts. Since
these rights still exist under § 103, it is perhaps not essential that federal
courts provide similar remedies. State courts may also be geared for
quicker action than federal courts. Furthermore, uniformity of decision
was not thought a crucial problem since- Congress specifically provided
for the retention of concurrent state jurisdiction. Even if one claim is
federal in nature, pendant jurisdiction may exist for the state "claim:
96. A third situation exists wherein procedures for calling meetings exist, but they are thought to be unreasonable or impractical. The
judicial process is no different than in the previous situation in which
no right is spelled out in the union laws. The court in each case must
set standards of propriety when no normative standards have been
established by Congress. Although courts are no doubt competent to act
in extreme cases, as when faced with a rule clearly designed to frustrate
member-initiated meetings, there are few benchmarks for determining
which rules present extreme situation$,

19671

UNION MEMBER'S RIGHT

B. FriEEDOM OF SPEECH
As previously discussed, freedom of speech under section
101 (a) (2) is divided into a meeting and a nonmeeting context.
Because the former right can be limited by "reasonable rules
relating to the conduct of meetings," it is generally thought that
this right is more limited than the right of free speech outside
of meetings. Any difference in the scope of speech, however,
is based on practicality and not principle. No one would expect
speech in the formalized context of a meeting to be completely
unregulated. Even without express union authority to regulate
speech at meetings, the courts would no doubt interpret the
broad right to permit union enforcement of rules of order and
propriety. These rules would no doubt have been permitted under the proviso permitting "reasonable rules relating to the responsibility of a member to his union as an institution."
The grant of free speech during meetings demonstrates the
lack of careful draftsmanship in the act. The right relates to
the expression of views upon candidates or upon any business
properly before the meeting. The union's right to limit speech
to business properly before the meeting assumes the same kind
of reasonable rules included in "reasonable rules pertaining to
the conduct of meetings." The former phrase could only have
an independent effect if the organization's established rules relating to meetings did not contain a relevancy rule. The word
properly suggests that the chairman may rule on the relevance
of a speaker's topic to the agenda even though there may not be
an established rule governing this situation. Although this reading makes both phrases meaningful, it would ironically undermine congressional desire to permit limitation of speech only
by established rules.
The right to speak about candidates is no doubt effective
only when election affairs are business properly before the meetings. A literal reading, however, suggests that members may
speak on candidates even though elections or candidates may
not be business properly before the meeting. Such a reading
would also be ironic in light of clear congressional intent not to
interfere with a union's attempt to properly regulate order and
propriety in membership meetings. The right to speak on candidates is probably limited by relevancy rules also, the expression being no more than unnecessary insurance that the election
process be democratic.
Rules of order, such as Robert's Rules, are expressly permitted. Writers have argued that these rules may be unneces-

MINNESOTA LAV7 REVIEW

[Vol. 51:403

sarily complex and difficult for many persons. Indeed, such
rules have distinct disadvantages in groups where few members
study parliamentary rules in detail. Such rules are designed to
let the majority act and a minority speak only if all of the
members act with full knowledge of all relevant provisions.
In the union context, knowledge of these rules often permits
97
the knowledgeable minority to control the majority.
Since the speech guarantee is limited to business properly
before the meeting, control over a meeting's agenda becomes
crucial.9 8 Criticism of union officers may only be properly before the meeting under new business. Must there be a new
business portion of the meeting? The union's rules may well
explicitly or implicitly require such a portion. Again, the need
to extend the granted rights to enforcement of union constitutional provisions and bylaws is apparent. Even if union rules
are enforced, however, union rules may be unclear or nonexistent. The power of the chairman to control a meeting is immeasurably strengthened by the power to control the agenda. 9
There is little difference between the member who is purposely
not recognized or shouted down and one who is not allowed to
speak because at no time is his subject properly before the
meeting. As stated above, however, the chairman's power to
limit speech to that properly before the meeting is not required
to be based upon established rules. Thus, action taken against
a member out of order does not literally have to be based upon
an express rule. The statute permits the court to decide if a
speaker's topic was relevant to union business, but the power to
establish union business resides in the officers. To properly
carry out congressional purpose, it will be necessary in some
cases to limit the union administration's authority to control the
meeting's agenda. The right to speak is empty, indeed, if there
is no proper time in which the right can be exercised. 100
97. SAYLES & STRAuss, op. cit. supra.note 91, at 171 (1953).
98. See COOK, UNION DEMOCRACY: PRACTICE AND IDEAL 180-83
(1963).
99. For an account of a "managed" meeting, see McFarland,
Leadership in a Local Labor Union Undergoing Organizational Stress,
N.Y. State School of Industrial and Labor Relations 48 (unpublished dissertation 1952).
100. In Scovile v. Watson, 338 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1964), plaintiff
attempted to move that the union arbitrate the propriety of her dismissal from employment. While she had the floor, the chair entertained
a successful motion to adjourn. The court held that plaintiff had failed
to allege that the motion to reconsider the union's failure to arbitrate
her discharge was in order and proper for consideration at that time.
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Unions should carefully review their rules of order so that
necessary rules are expressed, thereby making use of the statutory preferences for established rules.10 ' Such specificity may
be required because courts may well ignore the implications of
the phrase "business properly before the meeting" mentioned
above. In any event, unions will have to make certain that
speakers have had an opportunity at some time during the meeting to express their views.
Control of a meeting or its agenda is much less of a threat
than other factors beyond the reach of the law. Floor debate is
often vigorous and uninhibited, and many leaders rely solely
upon personal prestige or oratory to carry a point. But members must attend meetings in order to speak. The attendance
rate of union meetings, estimated at two to eight per cent, 10 2 is
a reminder that law serves primarily as a protector of rights,
and not as an insurer that those rights will be exercised.
C.

SPEECH AMD THE PROVISO

Most of the litigation under section 101 (a) (2) will probably
involve the proviso which constricts all rights given by the section. 0 3 The proviso is a statement of the institutional interests
The complaint must show a clear infringement. Compare George v.
Bricklayers Union, 255 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Wis. 1966).
101. The right to participate in the deliberations and the voting
upon the business of such meetings in § 101(a) (1) overlaps the grant
in § 101 (a) (2). Both sections are limited by reasonable rules of order.
The right in § 101 (a) (1) refers to the deliberations and the business of
such meetings, thus raising again the question of agenda control. Reasonable rules under § 101 (a) (1) must be made part of the organization's
constitution and bylaws; however, reasonable rules under § 101 (a) (2)
need only be established. It is unclear whether "established" refers to
formal adoption or whether it includes customary rules of practice.
Such a reading would give the fullest interpretation to the phrases in
each section, but careful draftmanship was not the hallmark of this
statute.
102. SAYLES & STRAuss, Op. cit. supra note 91, at 173 (1953). See
also BARBASH, LABOR's GRAss ROOTS 48-69 (1961); PURcELL, THE WoaxER

SPEAxs HIs MIND ON ComPANY AND UNION 193-221 (1954); RosEN &
RosEN, THE UNION MmBER SPEAxs 36 (1955); SEmDMAN, LONDON, KARSE,
& TAGLIAcOZZO, THE WoRa=n ViEws HIs UNION 186-91 (1958).

The above

studies refer to a whole array of factors to explain why lack of attendance is the norm, e.g., place and time of meetings, length of meetings,
boredom with detailed financial reports, and excessive parliamentarianism.
103. The proviso permits the union to adopt certain types of reasonable rules, but it does not specify that such rules be in such organization's constitution and bylaws or established. The meaning or purpose of this difference in language is hard to determine. "Adopt" suggests that rules must at least be established but not necessarily part of
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which are to be-weighed and balanced by individual rights. The
fact that the proviso limits a grant of rights indicates Congress'
overriding concern with individual political and civil rights within unions. The structure of the provision, in addition to the repeated analogy to the federal Bill of Rights, suggests that institutional interests must be strong indeed to overcome the interest
in protecting individual rights. The "presumption of constitutionality" has given way to a preferred position of individual
rights. Thus, not all reasonable rules may limit freedom of
speech and assembly, but only reasonable rules relating to the
two broad subjects in the proviso.,
A member's responsibility to his union, however, could be
read to permit almost any discipline. Nearly all union offenses
are justified on this ground, and even the reference to legal and
contractual obligations would seem to fall within a member's
obligation to his union.' 0 4 . It is hard to imagine conduct which
interferes with a union's performance of its legal and contractual
obligation which would be consistent With a member's responsibility to the union as an institution.
Although direct conflicts of organizational and individual interests may not be common, the cases have substantial impact
upon members when they arise. Similar conflicts can be found
in any complex organization, and our increasing concern with
the-union's, bylaws or constitution. Such a difference is important since
the union's constitution-may provide formalized procedures for amending
'or supplementing the constitution or bylaws. Extraordinary majorities
are required in a number of unions. BAIBAsH, LABOR's GRAss RoOTs 32

(1961). For a somewhat different interpretation, see Rosenberg, Interpretive Problems of Title I of the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act, 16 IND. & LAB. REL. R.v. 405, 419 (1963).
"Adopt" suggests that the creation of ad hoc rules to meet a particular sanction are proper. An ex post facto concept, however, may well be
employed to strike down rules adopted after the -speech or conduct
affected by the rule.
'104. Although the second portion of the proviso relates only to con-duct, incitement of unlawful behavior may be considered conduct within
-the proviso. Advocacy of a strike in breach of a collective bargaining
agreement is no less reprehensible- than the act of striking itself. Conduct -does not necessarily imply that speech cannot be sanctioned under
the proviso. Even writers who feel that conduct does not include speech
in general feel compelled to -prohibit speech which raises an immediate
danger that illegal conduct would result. See Rosenberg, supra note 103,
at 418. Compare Dunau, Some Comments on the Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations,N.Y.U. 14TH CONE. ON LABOR 77, 86 (1961).

In any event, the responsibility proviso is broad enough to cover speech
which -advocates action in breach of legal or contractual obligations.
Of course, the interference with legal obligations must be more than
fanciful.
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these problems no doubt relates to the increasing amount -of
bureaucratization and organization of our lives
The most significant case interpreting the grant of free
speech and the proviso is Salzhandler v. Caputo.' 5 Solomon
Salzhandler, financial secretary of a union local, discovered
what he considered to be financial malpractices by union officers.
Two checks had been drawn to cover the expenses of Webman,
the president and business agent, and one Max Schneider at
two union conventions to which they were elected delegates.
Each check was endorsed by Webman and his wife, but Schneider's endorsement did not appear on either cheek. About the
same time, two checks, each for six dollars, were drawn as refunds of dues paid by deceased members. Although such checks
were ordinarily made out to the widows, Webman brought the
two checks to Salzhandler and told him to deposit them in a
special fund for the benefit of the son of one of the deceased
members. Salzhandler refused to do this because the checks
Were not endorsed. Thereafter, trustees of the local 'endorsed
each check and Salzhandler made the deposit as Webman had
requested.
Thereafter, Salzhandler distributed a leaflet which, accused
Webman of improper conduct with regard to union funds and of
referring to members in derogatory terms. Attached to 'the
leallet were photostats of the four checks. 'With regard to'the
convention check, Salzhandler stated that the delegates presented their credentials at the convention and then disappeared:.
Fuithermore, the leaflet branded Webman as a petty robber in
relation to the two refund checks.
Webman filed charges against Salzhandler with the New
YZork district council of the union, alleging "Salzhandier had
violated various sections of the union constitution. The -trial
board decided that Salzhandler had falsely accused Webman of
the crime of larceny thereby violating the union's constitutional
provision against libel and slander. Salzhandler was suspended
from participation in the affairs of the local for five 'years. -He
could not attend meetings, 'ote on' any matter, have the foor
at any meetings, or be a candidate for any position. 'With a
trace of humor, the notice concluded that "in all other respects,
Brother Salzhandler's 'rights and obligations as a member of the
Brotherhood shall be continued."'10 6
Salzhandler thereupon commenced an action' -in federal
105. 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1963).
106. Id. at 448.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:403

district court alleging violation of his freedom of speech under
section 101 (a) (2). 107 The district court dismissed the complaint,
finding that the board's decision was warranted by the evidence. Additionally, the court made -m independent finding that
Salzhandler's charges were libelous and as such were not protected by section 101 (a) (2)..108 Before the Second Circuit, the
parties apparently focused on whether libel fell outside of the
grant of free speech in section 101 (a) (2) rather than the question of whether libel could be sanctioned under the proviso to
section 101 (a) (2). Supporting their position that free speech
under the act was not all inclusive, defendants urged an analogy
to the first amendment to limit the scope of the right. Indeed,
early pressures for reform legislation stressed paralleling the
Bill of Rights, 10 9 an equation which was to carry over to congressional debates, 10 and even the name given to Title I of the
LMRDA. Sponsors of legislation were no doubt aware that
libel and slander were generally thought to be beyond protection of the first amendment. Defendants relied upon Beauhar107. Plaintiff also requested reinstatement with back pay, damages
due to discrimination in job referrals, and pain and suffering caused by
his ejection from a meeting.
108. Salzhandler v. Caputo, 48 L.R.R.M. 3030 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
Judge Wham's opinion reflected past common law decisions which held
that intraunion defamation was not protected speech. See Ames v.
Dubinsky, 5 Misc. 2d 380, 70 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1947). See also
Shapiro v. Gehlman, 152 Misc. 13, 272 N.Y. Supp. 624 (Sup. Ct. 1934),
rev'd, 244 App. Div. 238, 278 N.Y. Supp. 785, affd as modified sub. nom.,
Shapiro v. Brennan, 269 N.Y. 517, 199 N.E. 515 (1935).
109. In 1941, the American Civil Liberties Union formed a committee on trade union democracy to study rights accorded individual union
members. Two years later, in a report entitled Democracy in Trade
Unions, the committee reported that freedom of speech was inadequately protected and recommended protection of the right to criticize
union officers and the right to protest outside the union. See ACLU,
DEMocRAcY iN TRADE UNIoNs 53 (1943).
The committee proposed a
Bill of Rights for union members to be guaranteed by the union constitution with limited state and federal legislation as an additional safeguard. Id. at 66. The proposal was submitted as a draft amendment to
the NLRA in 1947. Hearings Before the House Committee on Education
and Labor on Bills To Amend and Appeal the National Labor Relations
Act, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3633-43 (1947). The ACLU spokesman, Mr.
Fraenkel, equated the freedom of speech sought by the ACLU with freedom of speech under the Constitution. Id. at 3641-42. See also ACLU,
DEMocRAcY
nc

LABOR UNoNs (1952).

This position was later repeated.

Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on Labor on Union Financial
and Admitistrative Practicesand Procedures,85th Cong., 1st Sess. 111516 (1958).
110. See, e.g., 2 LEG. HiST. 1566 (remarks of Rep. Griffin) ; id. at 1645
(remarks of Rep. Landrum); id. at 1104 (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
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nais v. Illinois"' which held that the protection of the first
amendment did not extend to libel:
It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.12

The court, however, rejected the parallel to the first amendment, holding that the grant of free speech in section 101 (a) (2)
was absolute, and Congress designed the proviso to provide the
only limitation to free speech. Thus libel and slander, as forms
of expression, were not meant to be excluded from the grant
itself. The court stated that:
[I]n Beauharnais the Supreme Court recognized the possibility that state action might stifle criticism under the guise of
punishing libel. However, because it felt that abuses could be
prevented by the exercise of judicial authority, . . . the court
sustained a state criminal libel statute. But the union is not a
political unit to whose disinterested tribunals an alleged defamer can look for impartial review of his "crime." It is an
economic action group, the success of which depends in large
measure on a13unity of purpose and sense of solidarity among
its members.'

Although the court rejected a first amendment analogy, recent Supreme Court pronouncements make clear that the analogy, if proper, works against discipline for libel of union officers. In New York Times v. Sullivan,"14 the Supreme Court
imposed a constitutional limit on the power of states to award
damages to public officials defamed by critics of their official
conduct. A comparison of Sullivan and Salzhandler is instructive, as similar considerations motivated each court.
In Sullivan, the Supreme Court first looked at the speech
itself and found that the statement alleged defamatory dealt
with one of the critical problems of the day. The Court held
that the nature of the statement created a prima facie case for
first amendment protection. The question then became whether
the statement forfeited protection by the falsity of its factual
statements or by its defamatory injury.
The statement by Salzhandler parallels in a sense the statement in Sullivan. Criticism of official conduct is a matter of
interest to all members of the relevant community, in this
context the union membership. Criticism of official conduct
111.
112.
113.
114.

343 U.S. 250 (1952).
Id. at 256-57.
316 F.2d at 449-50.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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in the public sphere can be analogized to criticism of union
officials in this private sphere. Union governments have long
been compared to public government, and a member's statements about a union official's action may be as essential and
important to the membership as statements made about official
conduct or public issues.
The nature of the expression was also considered important
by the Salzhandlercourt. The court reasoned that criticism relating to mismanagement of union funds should be protected in part
because congressional concern was primarily directed toward
preventing this type of mismanagement. The court's emphasis
should not be employed, however, to limit rights protected by
this act. Many expressions should be protected because the
content relates to matters of legitimate concern of union members, despite the fact that they may not refer to subjects upon
which Congress expressed particular concern. Actually, congressional concern was directed basically toward three areas:
election of officers, trusteeships, and financial reporting. Indeed, bills introduced during the Eisenhower administration
dealt only with these areas. 115
The Supreme Court's protection of freedom of expression in
Sullivan is especially significant because in state damage actions
an impartial tribunal will decide questions of falsity and defamatory effect. In Salzhandler, the court realized that union tribunals were composed of laymen with little knowledge of the law
and who may well be interested in the outcome of the dispute.
Salzhandler, however, assumed that a trial de novo would not
be possible in district courts, ignoring the possibility of using a
lesser standard of review for decisions of union tribunals.
The Court in Sullivan rejected the test of truth: "Injury
to official reputation affords no more warrant for repressing
speech that would otherwise be free than does factual error.""16
Similarly, injury to official reputation and the combination of
injury and factual error were also rejected as bases for possible
limitation of speech. Good faith error was deemed protected;
actual malice was made the test of actionable libel. The failure
to create an absolute right of criticism, as advocated by Justices
Douglas, Black, and Goldberg, may indicate a recognition of
competing interests.
In the Landrum-Griffin context, those interests are institu115. S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959); S. 748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
116. 376 U.S. at 272.
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tional interests and are recognized in the proviso. The Salzhandler court rejected the defense that members have a responsibility to the union as an institution not to libel officers,
by finding that, to the contrary, they had the duty to speak out
"in the interest of proper and honest management of union affairs .... -117 Similarly, the Supreme Court has stated that a
citizen not only has the right but the duty to criticize governmental policies and official conduct."18 False statements are
inevitable in fair debate and must be protected if the freedoms
of expressions are to have the breathing space they need to
survive. 1 9 Punishment tends to generate self-censorship, deterring what in fact is true "because of doubt whether it can
''
be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do sO. 2
As Professor Kalven has stated, speech is in a sense overprotected in order to assure that it is not underprotected.12' Echoing this concern, the Salzhandler court felt that each union
member could not be expected "at the peril of union discipline"
to draw the "thin and tenuous line between what is libelous and
what is not."' 22 The Supreme Court may well have been aware
of the "difficulty of proving truth" and of "putting the speaker to
the risk of proof before fallible judges, juries, or administrative
officials."'1 23 This recognition of judicial incapacity to make
nice discriminations strengthens the view of the Salzhandler
court that even laymen cannot be expected to make these nice
discriminations.
Turning to the statutory language, the Second Circuit concluded that Congress intended only the two exceptions set out in
the proviso. The court's presentation of legislative history is a
model of simplicity. The McClellan Bill of Rights contained a
117. 316 F.2d at 450.
118. The Court may well expand official conduct to other areas. It
has already been broadened to include criticism which might "touch on
an official's fitness for office." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77
(1964). The Court's concern with issues in which the public has legitimate concern would not seem confined to references to officials or official conduct. See Comment, 75 YALE L.J. 642, 644-45 (1965). Whether
or not one of the participants is an officer, open debate is still necessary.
Similarly, the protection afforded by Salzhandler should not be limited
to criticism of official conduct, but should include discussions of union
policy.
119. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964).
120. Id. at 279.
121. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "the Central
Meaning of the FirstAmendment," 1964 Sup. CT. Rnv. 191.
122. 316 F.2d at 451.
123. Kalven, supra note 121, at 212.
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free speech clause "absolute in form."'124 Upon "reconsideration,"
the "free speech section was amended to include the two express
exceptions.' 1 25 The McClellan provisions "took away the power
the Kuchel
of the union to punish for expression of views" and 126
substitute "restored the power in only two situations."'
In an opinion marked by real insights, the abuse of logic
and legislative history reflected in the prior paragraph is striking indeed. The court first assumed that the McClellan proposal absolute in form was absolute in fact. Second, the court
assumed that the guarantee in the substitute measure was no
different than that in McClellan's bill. Senator Kuchel, however, substituted a whole new bill of rights, not simply a speech
section. Therefore, the court's use of the word "amended" is
very misleading. Third, the court assumed that the proviso "restored" powers removed by the McClellan Bill, rather than merely clarifying implied exceptions to the grant of rights to protect
against undue judicial interference in internal union affairs. The
language used by the court, "absolute in form," "section was
amended," "took away power to punish for expression of views,"
and "restored the power in only two situations," represent a
high order of judicial deck-stacking. The result, however, is
probably a wise one, but for different reasons, and despite legislative history.
The court is correct in referring to Senator McClellan's free
speech provision as absolute in form:
Sec. 101(3)-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-Every member... shall
have the right to express any views, arguments, or opinions regarding any matter respecting such organization or its officers,
agents, or representatives, and to disseminate such views, arguments, or opinions either orally or in printed, graphic, or
discipline, or
visual form, without being subject to penalties,
27
interference of any kind by such organization.1
It is erroneous, however, to assmne that the section was absolute in fact. Courts would no doubt have permitted reasonable
limitations, at a minimum permitting "reasonable rules relating
to the conduct of meetings." Furthermore, there is no reason to
believe that Senator McClellan envisioned a broader right of
expression than that granted by the first amendment. Indeed,
the Senator explicitly analogized his bill to the Bill of Rights:
If this bill should be enacted into law, it will bring to the
124. 105 CONG. REc. 6476 (1959).
125. 316 F.2d at 450, n.8; 105 CONG. REc. 6715-27 (1959).

126. 316 F.2d at 450, n.8.
127. S. 1137, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted at 1 LEa. HIST.
268.
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conduct of union affairs and to union members the reality of
some of the freedoms from oppression that we enjoy as citizens
by virtue of the Constitution of the United States, which28incidentally does not make an exception for union members.'
The most damaging evidence of the court's oversimplification

is an explicit reference by Senator McClellan to implied limits in
his bill. Although he was replying to hostile criticism of the AFLCIO, there is no reason to believe that the Senator was mislead-

ingly deemphasizing the scope of his provision:
AFL-CIO contends that sections 101(a) (1) and (2), which
provide equal rights and privileges and free speech and assembly, are too broad. They observe, however, that unions are obviously entitled to make reasonable rules and regulations with
respect to the rights of members relating to the conduct of
business at union meetings.
The answer: This limitation, that the unions might make
reasonable rules relating to equal rights and free speech and
assembly was implicit in the bill of rights as originally drafted,
just as it is implicit in the
29 Bill of Rights in the Federal Constitution to prevent abuses.'

The Senator's colleagues were well aware that his amendment contained implied restrictions. Their reason for insisting
on a change in language was the fear that the absence of express
restrictions altogether would induce courts to overlook the implied power of unions to make reasonable rules necessary for
the union's protection. 130
Finally, there is Senator Kuchel's own statement in relation
to the substitute concerning libel and slander:
[It] seemed to us that the language in the amendment of the
able Senator from Arkansas ... was too broad, and that there
are in this land of ours, for example, reasonable laws governing
libel and slander ....
By the language of our amendment...
we attempt to provide for the rule 31
of reason with reasonable
restraints on the right of free speech.1

The court is correct in referring to this quote as ambiguous.
Even before Sazhandler, this particular phrase had caused difficulties. 32 Senator Kuchel referred to libel and slander only
as examples of reasonable restraints of the constitutional right
of free speech. The "language of our amendment," which provides for such reasonable rules, is obviously the proviso, the
only relevant addition to the original McClellan language. The
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

2 LEG. HIST. 1098. See also 2 LEG. IsT. at 1104.
2 LEG. HIST. 1294.
See 2 LEG. HST. 1231 (remarks of Senator Kuchel).
2 LEG. HIST. 1231.
See Thatcher, Rights of Individual Union Members under Title

I and Section 610 of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 52 GEo. L.J. 339, 349
(1964).
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sentence implies that if libel and slander are unprotected, they
are so because of the operation of the proviso and not because
these limits are implied in the grant of the right of free speech
itself. The reference to libel and slander indicates that Senators were aware of this limit of first amendment rights, although
the statement also implies that the McClellan proposal protected
defamatory utterances. As shown above, however, McClellan's bill was not absolute, and evidence suggests that Senator
Kuchel and others were aware of this. 3 3 If so, the reference
may have been aimed merely at drumming up support.
Hypothetical analysis of this statement made in debate
leads to a number of different interpretations and perhaps is
of little value. The reference to slander and libel, if anything
more than a reference to a type of reasonable restraint, suggests that if this exception is to be made at all, it is to be

based upon the proviso.
The Senate accepted the Kuchel substitute in place of the
McClellan proposal. In so doing, the Senate did more than

make two exceptions to section 101 (a) (2), rather, it made a
number of significant changes. 134

The assumption that free

speech meant the same thing under each bill is unsupported.
Even if true, however, evidence suggests that the McClellan Bill
was more limited than the court presumed. Thus, a strong case
can be made that drafters of the McClellan and Kuchel bills
did not mean to protect libelous statements.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the Kuchel substitute
broadened the grant of speech in the McClellan Bill. Indeed,
the drafters were concerned to expressly state a countervailing body of institutional interests to the individual right of free
speech. Although the bill as enacted was basically the Housepassed Landrum-Griffin Bill, the free speech section of the
House Bill was modeled after the Senate-passed version. Although a fairly strong case can be made that libel and slander
are not included in the grant of free speech, there are important
reasons for assuming that the exception can only be found in
the proviso.
The court's analysis of the statute is also open to criticism.
A decision that libel does not fall within the responsibility proviso, and therefore cannot be penalized, appears to be based upon
the structure of the provision. A right is given, and a proviso
permitting certain types of reasonable rules limits that right.
133. See 2 LEa. HIST. 1231 (statement by Senator Kuchel).
134.

See 2

LEG. HIST.

1230.
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The court assumes that Salzhandler's speech falls within section

101(a) (2)'s free speech grant, and they are no doubt correct.
Since a member has an obligation to speak out, even if remarks
are defamatory, the court reasoned, defamation violates no responsibility owed to the union as an institution.
Analyzing the situation in this fashion, the court overstates
the individual interest. The court assumes that no defamatory
statement can violate a reasonable obligation owed to the union.
Although the court correctly analyzed the nature of plaintiff's
statements in terms of statutory purpose, there is no explicit
recognition that section 101 (a) (2) creates countervailing interests. Though plaintiff's conduct should be protected, this can be
accomplished without prohibiting discipline for all libel. It was
the nature and context of plaintiff's expression which led to its
protection and not the mere fact that the union's discipline was
based on libel.
If libel was excluded from the grant of rights, then the substantive aspects of union imposition of libel sanctions could not
be scrutinized under the act. This result suggests that the court
was correct in permitting review of the application of the union's
libel provision. Of course, even without SalzhandZer, union
discipline for libel would still be subject to scrutiny for procedural regularity. Short of de novo judicial determinations,
however, the court's ability to protect speech might prove inadequate in some cases. The prospect of an adverse initial
determination might deter expression of opinion by members
whose right to free speech would have been vindicated upon
review. 13r While this objection would be somewhat lessened by
postponing the operation of discipline pending judicial review,136
such discipline might still be objectionable since the stigma attached to an initial adjudication of guilt might similarly deter
legitimate criticism. Furthermore, since judicial intervention
may require exhaustion of internal remedies for a period not to
exceed four months, 37 courts could not compel immediate sus135. In Deacon v. Operating Eng'rs, Local 12, 59 L.R.R.M. 2706 (S.D.
Cal. 1965), the court refused to enjoin forthcoming disciplinary proceedings upon charges that plaintiff libeled the union in statements made
to a newspaper reporter.
136. In Nelson v. Brotherhood of Painters, 47 L.R.R.M. 2441 (D.
Minn. 1961), the court suspended union imposed discipline until the case

could be heard, finding reasonable belief that plaintiffs' rights were violated. Plaintiffs' suspension had rendered them ineligible to run for
office in a forthcoming election.

137. LMRDA § 101(a) (4), 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (4)
(1964).
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pension of the penalty, and a member's protection would depend
solely upon the beneficence of union officers. On the other
hand, by reading libel and slander out of the proviso, the court
has foreclosed any union discipline for libelous statements.
Given the broad protection granted by Salzhandler, two possible limitations can be considered. Although the court stressed
that Salzhandler's statements referred to alleged financial irregularities, and thus touched an area of prime congressional
concern, the court would probably protect libelous utterances related to union affairs even if the subject was not of the type
which "motivated the enactment of the statute.' 138 Another
possible limitation on the protection given to libelous utterances
would be a requirement that the speech relate to internal union
affairs. A recent case, following SaZzhandler, suggested this limitation by stating that "if the underlying topic of conversation
concerns union affairs, then arguments, questions, or accusations
139
relating thereto are protected."'
The court's statement cannot be reversed, i.e., speech which
does not relate to union affairs may nevertheless be protected
because it may have little impact on the union as an institution.
Assuming that the grant of free speech is read broadly, the
union may penalize speech only when it falls within the proviso,
and "nonunion" speech is unlikely to violate a responsibility owed
to the union. If the grant only protects speech relating to union
affairs, the act would then have the absurd effect of permitting
union discipline of speech having no relation to union affairs.
On the other hand, protecting all speech which relates to
union affairs would violate the intent of the first provisio-to
permit discipline when the speech violates a union responsibility.
Thus, the scope of the act cannot be determined simply by
whether the speech relates to union affairs. The proper question is whether the speech violates an obligation owed to the
union as an institution. Libel as such should neither be excluded from the scope of the act, nor excluded as a sanction in
a proper case.
The proviso standard of "responsibility to the union as an
institution" provides an altogether different standard for proper
discipline which cannot be applied by simply asking whether
the union can punish for libel or whether the speech relates
to an area of primary congressional concern or union affairs.
138.

316 F.2d at 451.

139. Stark v. Twin City Carpenters, 53 L.R.R.M. 2640, 2647 (D. Minn.
1963).
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A member may violate his responsibility to his union by uttering defamatory remarks in a particular situation. Furthermore,
even if libelous statements are not punishable as libel, they may
still violate an obligation owed to the union. The statement
to
which falsely accuses officers of crimes and urges members 14
0
join a rival, violates an obligation to maintain the institution.
To protect the libel but permit penalizing the call to resign represents legal unreality. The libel is part of the statement, and
it is the part which makes the call to the membership a real
threat to institutional stability. Since a nonlibelous call to
join a rival union falls within the proviso, there is no reason to
protect all libelous statements. Clearly, charges which libel
officers do not necessarily constitute irresponsibility to the union
or cause damage to the union as an institution. Loyalty to the
union like loyalty to one's country does not require subjection to
the present administration.' 4 ' Thus, critics who argue that
members have a responsibility not to hold officers to false public contempt go too far. 42 On the other hand, some defamatory
statements may violate valid institutional interests.
Furthermore, a member may violate his responsibility to
his union by nonlibelous utterances just as he can by libelous
statements. Thus, urging workers to join a rival union or urging workers on strike to return to work probably violates a
responsibility owed to the union. 43 Just as all nonlibelous statements are not protected, all libelous statements cannot be protected. The result of the court's interpretation of the act, ironically, is to protect all libelous speech even though the statute
clearly does not protect all nonlibelous speech. The point is, of
140. See Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor
Reform Act of 1959, 58 MxcH. L. REV. 819 (1960).
141. Those who are angered by union officials' denunciations of
critics as traitors, troublemakers or communists, should compare official and unofficial reaction to dissenters and critics of Viet Nam war
policies. Especially analogous is the tendency of public officials to take
criticism personally.
142. See Thatcher, supra note 132. See also Sigal, Freedom of
Speech and Union Discipline: The "Right" of Defamation and Disloyalty,
N.Y.U. 17TH CoNF. ON LABOR 367, 373 (1964).
143. Advocating that a strike be called off, however, is probably
protected even though it weakens the union's will to resist and weakens
the union's image. This conduct advocates a change in union policy
unlike a back to work movement which directly challenges union authority and responsibility. Calls for wildcat strikes in breach of contract
or for action in violation of the NLRA are not protected. The responsibility proviso would cover these situations even if the second proviso
is read to cover conduct excluding speech. See Dunau, supra note 104,
at 85.
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course, that responsibility to the union as an institution is the
proper statutory formula under which the balancing of institutional and individual interests is to be carried out.
Thus, regulations dealing with member activities which adversely affect the union fall within the proviso. 44 The union
must be able to protect itself, for example, against conduct
which seriously weakens the union as a collective bargaining
agent. Salzhandler's statements probably did not affect the
public's view of the union but probably added to the union's
almost continuous internal strife.145 Slander of officers is perhaps most serious when it reaches the public or employers. But
the officer libeled is not the union, and the injury to the union
46

is of a different nature.
If a member criticizes bargaining demands, the employer may
believe that the union will have difficulty calling and maintaining a strike, and to that degree, bargaining strength is diminished.
The expression of hostile views by a member may lessen public
support and sympathy for the union. Speech which has an unfavorable impact on bargaining strength is affected by considera144. Professor Cox has stated that § 101 (a) (2):
carries the legal protection of dissent a step farther by guaranteeing union members freedom of speech both inside and outside union meetings, and also by securing the critics an opportunity to meet for the purpose of organizing their opposition.
The latter privilege would seem essential to the formation of
effective minorities even though it flies in the face of traditional trade union opposition to any form of caucus or separate
assemblage. However, dissent in a union, like treason within
a nation, must be suppressed if the purpose is to destroy the
union, encourage a rival, or bring about the violation of legal
or contractural obligations. Section 101 (a) (2) contains an exception for these cases.
Cox, supra note 140, at 834.
145. See Hall, The Painters Union: Autocracy and Insurgency, New
Politics, Spring, 1964; Schimpff, Brotherhood of Painters,District Coun-

cil 9 of New York City, Case Study, Yale Law Library (unpublished
paper 1963).
146. Union attorneys have argued that libel directed at an officer's
handling of funds, for instance, impairs the effectiveness and prestige of
the union. Sigal, supra note 142, at 373. It is not surprising that union
attorneys reflect the quasi-military and economic views of a union. Representing the union in court actions and before the NLRB, the attorney
sees the employer as a monolithic entity and the union's major opponent.
Thus, the union's fighting qualities are emphasized-the ability to react
quickly to employer thrusts and the need of discipline to insure unity.
Of 152 constitutions of unions affiliated with the federation, 125
make it an offense to libel or slander a union officer and all but three
have general punitive provisions with regard to libel. See Sherman, The

Individual Member and the Union: The Bill of Rights Title in the LaborManagement Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 803,

817 (1959); Thatcher, supra note 132, at 347.
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tions of national labor policy. The NLRA makes the union the
bargaining representative for all members in an appropriate unit,
and the minority is bound by the union's decision in bargaining
matters. Majority control is necessary because Congress desired
to encourage as well as protect collective bargaining. Thus, the
protection of bargaining strength is consistent with federal labor
147
policy.
On the other hand, although membership implies a recognition and acceptance of various obligations, complete freedom to
discipline cannot be permitted because a worker's voice in economic decisionmaking which vitally affects him depends upon
union membership.
Moreover, congressional purpose would not require the union
to maintain as members persons who are actively working for
the destruction of the organization. 148 Responsibility at a
minimum includes the absence of purpose to destroy or weaken
the union or intent to encourage a rival. That is, the section
clearly permits an institutional interest in survival. Danger to
survival, of course, may be of varying degree; some threats are
immediate and serious, while others may be clear but not present
dangers. The immediacy of the threat is one of the factors to,
be considered in determining adverse impact upon the union.
Although requiring purpose to harm might be a compromise
for courts like Saizhandler which have little respect for union
trial tribunals, the difficulty of defining purpose is not substantially less arduous than defining fair comment. The recognition of the validity of union institutional interests by Congress
suggests that responsibility should not be limited to a hostile
intent but should also include foreseeable circumstances. The
purpose to harm could be inferred, of course, and the probable
result of a member's conduct could indicate a purpose to harm. 149
If the federal constitution is to serve as a guide for the
interpretation of rights granted by the act, then limitations on
those rights would have to be justified by important needs of
the union. Thus, an interest in preventing criticism, even un147. See Rosenberg, supra note 103, at 416.
148. In Farowitz v. Local 802, Associated Musicians, 53 L.R.R.M.
2843 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), the court stated that plaintiff did not intend to
harm the union by urging members to refuse to pay dues when plaintiff felt collection was ultra vires. See also Cox, supra note 140, at 834.
The proviso, however, does not specifically require intent to harm. See
Thatcher, supra note 132, at 349.
149. For a similar formulation under the discrimination section of
the NLRA, see Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 49 (1954).
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founded, would not suffice. Speech interfering with rights of
others, however, such as filibusters or disruptions at meetings
can be restricted. 150
The union was long ago described as a combination town
meeting and military group. "Imagine the conflict in the soul
of a union official who must have the attitude and discharge the
functions at one and the same time of both a general and a
chairman of a debating society."' 51 Although Congress has in a
sense mooted the question of the wisdom of enforcing democratic
rights within unions, Congress was aware that institutional interests limit the scope of the rights protected.
American unionists, extremely security conscious, are intensely alert to dual union movements and other potentially
divisive conduct. While many feel that the day of the union as
an embattled and weak institution is over, those who have
lived through the early difficult battles are unconvinced. Furthermore, the wide diversity of unions and labor-management
environments in the United States makes it impossible to lump
the teamsters and the textile union, the carpenters and the agricultural workers, in one hypothesis of present union strength.
Histories of serious internecine battles with corrupt or communist elements or experience with company spies make it difficult to convince unionists that complete freedom within unions
is wise.'5
The first part of the proviso to section 101 (a) (2), responsibility to the union as an institution, requires an inquiry into
possible adverse impact upon the union. Criticism of union officers need not adversely affect the union; if the union is not
so affected, then the member has not violated an obligation
owed to the union. However, there are instances when statements directed at officers will damage the union. Unions must
be able to discipline as a "shield against crippling attacks upon
150.

See Angoff, Conduct of Meetings, Discipline, Enforcement,
ON LABOR 305, 309; Givens, Federal Protection of Employee Rights Within Trade Unions, 29 FoRDEAM L. REv. 259, 277 (1960).

N.Y.U. 13TH CoNF.

For constitutional analogies, see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949);
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). Fighting words which tend
to cause immediate violence can be restrained. See Chaplinsky v. New

Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).

151. Muste, Factional Rights in Trade Unions, in AMERIcAN LABOR
DYNA CS, 332-33 (Hardman ed., 1928).
152. See generally HARRIS, LABOR'S CIVIL WAR (1940); KAmPELMAAN,
THE COMMUNIST PARTY VS. THE CIO (1957); SAPoss, ComlvmuNism IN
AzvERIcAN UNIONS (1959); TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR INflxAnucAN HISTORY,
chs. 22, 30, 47 (1964).
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its vital functions.' 53 The collective bargaining function can be
seriously harmed by accusations which lessen the confidence of
members in their negotiations. The support of the public, important during negotiations or a strike, can be undermined by
strategically timed charges. Charges of corruption, immorality,
or communism directed at officers during organization, strikes,
or bargaining can have disastrous consequences. The confidence of members and the public is necessary if the union is to
54
carry out its congressional role.
As mentioned earlier, the proviso is broad enough to include many kinds of restraints and, indeed, unions would justify
all their express sanctions and penalties in much the same language. The statute of course requires a judicial definition of
responsibility. 5 5 No regulations which cannot be justified under
153. Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 472, 478 (1964).
Libel intended to weaken a strike effort, or violation of a picket
line, in a good faith but misguided attempt to further union aims, damages the union's role as collective bargaining agent. The union should
have power to deal with both situations. Although only one of the situations involves speech, both types of conduct may adversely affect the
union as an institution and thus may violate an obligation owed to the
union.
154.

See Summers, DisciplinaryPowers of Unions, 3 IND'. & LAB. REL.

REV. 483, 488-92 (1950); Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 472, 478-79 (1964).
155. The courts may well look to state court decisions reviewing
union disciplinary action under common law standards in determining
the kinds of conduct which may properly be considered to be inconsistent with a member's institutional responsibilities. See Summers, The
Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175,
176-77 (1960). State courts have permitted discipline for strike breaking. See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARv. L.
State courts have also permitted discipline
REV. 1049, 1062-72 (1951).
when a member joins another union and solicits members. Davis v.
International Alliance of Theatrical Employees, 60 Cal. App. 2d 713, 141
P.2d 486 (1943); Zalnerovich v. Van Ausdal, 65 N.Y.S.2d 650 (Sup. Ct.
1946). Assisting the company in the dispute with the union or passing
confidential information to the employer violates union obligations.
Becker v. Calnan, 313 Mass. 625, 48 N.E.2d 668 (1943). Disciplining
members for violating decrees and rules which relate to the basic policies
of the union and its functions in the collective bargaining system is
proper. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Rosenberg, 49 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
State courts have provided significant protection in the area of external political activities. Initially, members were held to be bound by
majority decisions. Today, this line of cases has been substantially overruled. See Blumrosen, The Individual and the Union, 86 MONTHLY LABOR
REV. 659, 663-64 (1963). State courts have also prevented the imposition
of discipline for the exercise of public rights or the performance of public duties not primarily related to internal union affairs. See, e.g., Collins v. International Alliance of Theatrical Employees, 119 N.J. Eq. 230,
182 Atl. 37 (Ch. 1935); Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113
Atl. 70 (1921). But see Harrison v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks,
271 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964). The cases may underemphasize the
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either exception can be employed to penalize speech.1 5"
The Salzhandler court argues that far from violating plaintiff's responsibility to the union, "it would seem clearly in the
interest of proper and honest management of union affairs to
permit members to question the manner in which the union's officials handle the union's funds and how they treat the union's
members."'1 7 Whether or not a member always has a responsibility to speak out when he feels officers have mismanaged or
mishandled the union's affairs, it is clear that Congress wanted
to protect this kind of expression. Democratic participation is
impossible without the freedom to question and criticize.
Whether this right extends to false statements is another question, however. The court has apparently excluded union discipline based upon libelous statements.
Since Congress desired to encourage speech as well as to protect it, it is not unreasonable to remove the potential deterrent
of punishment for libel and slander. The Supreme Court has
protected the criticism of public officers in order to encourage
speech in public matters. Perhaps there are valid reasons for
going further in the internal union area than the Court has gone
in the public officer cases. Since the injured party presumably
has a tort action in state court, unions cannot impose a further
penalty upon a member for the same injury. Allegedly slanderprotection given these rights because the courts, limited by the contract
theory, have tended to protect conduct by discovering procedural deficiencies rather than by creating substantive rights. See Wollett & Lampman, The Law of Union Factionalism-The Case of the Sailors, 4 STAN.
L. REV. 177, 200 (1952).
While state courts have often departed from the contract theory in
protecting rights or the exercise of duties not primarily related to internal union affairs, they have rarely held that union members possess
inherent rights to participate in intraunion political activity. See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARv. L. REV. 1049, 1069
(1951); Wollett & Lampman, supra at 200. Nevertheless, expelled members are usually reinstated when disciplined for such activity. See Summers, Union Democracy and Union Discipline, N.Y.U. 5TH CoNF. ON
LABOR 443, 478 (1952).
Recent cases, however, are less reticent in explaining frankly the
underpinnings of such rulings. The right of fair criticism has been explicitly stated and protected. See Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 151
N.E.2d 73 (1958); Crossen v. Duffy, 90 Ohio App. 252, 103 N.E.2d 769
(1951). These cases can provide only guides, however, and the statements of broad policies, although echoed in Congress, do not simplify
analysis under the LMRDA.
156. In many cases, speech is clearly protected by the act. See, e.g.,
International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307 (9th Cir.
1965); George v. Bricklayers, 255 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Wis. 1966); Graham
v. Soloner, 220 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
157. 316 F.2d at 450.
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ous remarks are likely to involve officers, often better able than
the disciplined member to afford law suits. Because officers are
concerned about their status within and without the union, they
have an incentive to begin tort suits. Indeed, the imbalance of
wealth present in many cases suggests that section 101 (a) (2)
might well have to be read to modify state tort law to be effective. Professor Summers'6 1 suggests that it would "seem
inappropriate that a federal definition of the bounds of free
speech in an area where national interest predominates, should
be ignored by states in defamation actions." Congress, however,
was concerned with union imposed penalties and not necessarily
with protection under state tort law. If Congress wanted penalties for defamation to be restricted to tort suits, as Salzhandler
assumes, then section 101 (a) (2) should have no necessary effect
on the scope of state libel actions. Yet, a recent Supreme Court
decision suggests that the LMRDA might well be read to require proof of malice and damages. In Linn v. United Plant
Guard Workers,159 the Court held that state libel actions were
not preempted by the NLRA if the plaintiff could prove that the
"statements were made with malice and injured him."'160
The Court grounded this limitation in part on the threat to
free discussion. Thus, the Sullivan standards were imposed by
analogy. Indeed, should that decision be expanded beyond
public officers, the first amendment may itself limit the scope of
state libel actions involving union members.
Although a tort remedy exists, no one has ever advocated
that damages are an adequate recompense for the damage done
by tortious conduct. Libel may cause harm which cannot even
be estimated. Individual harm can be remedied to some extent,
but harm to the union often cannot be measured in dollars.
For example, it would be impossible to estimate the damage
done by slanderous statements during a strike or collective bargaining negotiations. Proof of harm or proof of miscalculation
by the employer based upon these statements is not the kind of
harm that can be estimated in damages. The Salzhandler reference to the availability of tort actions is thus irrelevant to
harm done to the union as an institution.
The impact of statements or activity upon the union as an
institution can only be determined by inquiry into a wide vari158. Summers, Pre-emptionand the Labor Reform Act-Dual Rights
and Remedies, 22 Omo ST. L.J. 119, 127, n.48 (1961).
159. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
160. Id. at 55.
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ety of factors. 161 For example, the context in which the statements were uttered is significant. Did the speaker publish his
remarks to other members, e.g., in a meeting or through handbills, or did he speak through a nonunion group or write to a
local newspaper?
Timing of remarks is vitally significant. Were the remarks
spoken during a membership drive, an organizational campaign,
a union election, strike, or during collective bargaining negotiations? Were the remarks spoken during an internal election
campaign or a period of relative institutional stability? The timing bears on both a member's intent and the likelihood of institutional harm.
The nature of the remarks and their effect is also significant.
If false, were the remarks made in a good faith attempt to correct
an alleged injustice? How serious was the complaint? Could
the remarks weaken public or member support for the union?
How did they affect prospective members? Would the remarks
be likely to weaken the union's bargaining position, e.g., by making a strike threat less credible or by raising questions about the
union determination to remain on strike?
To whom were the statements addressed-an officer, the
union, or another member? 62 If directed at an officer, did the
remarks relate to general fitness for office or particular activities alleged to be criminal? Furthermore, the strength and
stability of the union is relevant. Adverse impact often will
depend upon the industrial environment. Allegations of communism, corruption, or racial bias may not seriously weaken
may well be disassteel or auto workers in northern cities, but
63
Carolina.1
South
in
union
textile
a
for
trous
A union that is struggling to attain status or is fighting for its
life as an organization should be permitted to demand from its
members a higher degree of solidarity against the "enemy" than
a union that enjoys majority support of the employees in a bargaining unit and government protection, under statute, of its
exclusive position as the bargaining agent. 1 64
Unions with continual, vitriolic internal strife such as Painters District Council 9 in New York City might be expected to
produce a host of discipline cases, especially involving libel and
slander. In such cases, the history and traditional aims of the
161. See Comment, 73 YALE, L.J. 472, 480 (1964).
162. See 105 CONG. REc. 15680 (1959).
163. See, e.g., Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962); Rony, Labor
Drives to Close the South's Open Shop, The Reporter, Nov. 18, 1965, p. 31.
164. Wollett & Lampman, supra note 155, at 213.
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union involved would seem to be relevant. 65 Factional and
ideological battles in unions leave a residue of distrust of any
opposition. Hardman in 1928 made the following perceptive
comment: "The memory of the left-wing administration in New
York will most likely, for a long time to come, make impossible any effective orderly opposition in American trade unionism." 66 Internal cleavages may suggest that some statements
have a greater impact in some unions than in others. On the
other hand, the more open and long standing internal strife has
been in a union, the more likely members are to expect heated or
"fighting" words, and the less impact any one statement is
likely to have on the union as an institution. This factor, then,
is of dubious value. It would be important, however, to know
whether the speech was typical of ordinary debate.
It is questionable whether courts are able to make such detailed investigation of the relevant context and develop standards of proper conduct from that context. Doubts concerning
the ability of courts to make necessary distinctions have led
some writers to urge the creation of impartial, union created
trial tribunals.1'6
Professor Summers, however, suggests that
judicial capability is demonstrated by what courts do, not what
they say. He found that state courts did obtain a complete
factual picture, and many demonstrated ability to understand
the operations of unions. 108 Thus, scrutiny of a union trial
board's determination, although not a de novo review, may be
sufficient to develop workable standards. Clearly, a trial de
novo would violate congressional intention to minimize governmental intervention into the internal affairs of unions. There
are continual references in the legislative debates to Congress'
faith in the principal of pluralism and the need for nongovernmental agencies to be left as free as possible. Statements such
as "great care should be taken not to undermine union's self165. Unions designated as uplift unions by Hoxie, for example,
could be expected to be extremely hesitant to place formal restrictions
on democratic practices. Restrictions, if present, could be expected to
be justified as protecting democracy itself. See SAYLES & STRAuss, THE
LOCAL UNION: ITS PLACE IN THE INDUSTRiAL PLANT 250-51 (1953).

Hoxie

described four functional types of unions: uplift, business, revolutionary, and predatory. HoxIE, TRADE UNIONISM I THE UNITED STATES 44-52
(1920).
166. HARDMAN, AvERIcAN LABOR DYNxAaVcs 34 (1928).

167. See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV.
L. REV. 1049, 1101 (1951); Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 472 (1964).

168. Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do
in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 223-24 (1960).
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government" are found throughout the legislative history. 60
Thus, the power of unions to discipline was not removed, but,
rather, it was limited by procedural and substantive rules.
Considering all these factors, Salzhandler's remarks were
justifiably protected. The justification, however, is found in the
important nature of the remarks and the weak institutional interest in suppressing the statements, not in the absolute protection of all defamatory statements from union libel provisions.
It is doubtful whether the union's bargaining strength was affected. The remarks were apparently not made in the midst of
an organizational or election campaign, and certainly the remarks did not relate to any such campaign. Furthermore, it is
highly doubtful that Salzhandler, an officer, intended to undermine the union as an institution as opposed to undermining
Webman's position as president. Furthermore, Salzhandler's remarks related to financial irregularities, which like corruption,
were the kind of expression thought crucial by Congress. Whether true or false, a strong showing of institutional harm should
be required to justify punishing this kind of expression. "[T] he
Act was designed largely to curtail such vices as the mismanagement of union funds, criticism of which by union members is
70
always likely to be viewed by union officials as defamatory."1
A number of factors may have influenced the court in SaZzhandZer besides those expressly relied upon.17 ' As mentioned
earlier, internal strife, mingled with charges of corruption or
communism, are not new to the Painters Union. 7 2 The court
may have felt that Salzhandler's comments were not different
from ordinary debate between the various factions in District

Council

9.173

The result may also have been influenced by the penalty
169. See the Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare Accompanying S. 1555, S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 7
(1959). See -also 105 CoNG. REC. 6476 (1959) (remarks- of Senator
McClellan).
170. See Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1963).
171. Professor Summers has argued that state courts often decided
internal union cases on factors not given prominence in the opinions.
Summers, supra note 168, at 175.
172. See French v. Caputo, 53 L.R.R.M. 2417 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963),
in which local officers were penalized by District Council 9's trial board
for circulating leaflets criticizing district council officers. Injunction
against enforcement of disc-'plinary penalties was granted as circulation
,fell within allowable expression. See also Schimpff, supra note 145.
173. Any recent issue of "District Council 9 News" will indicate the
vitriolic nature of the debate. Compare with 'Painter's Free Press," a
rebel newspaper,
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imposed and the procedure employed. Salzhandler was barred
from participating in union affairs for five years, preventing him
from attending meetings, nominating candidates, electing officers, and participating in general in union affairs. 17 4 Although
the act does not deal with the extent to which a member can be
penalized for nonprotected conduct, courts can be expected to
consider the penalty imposed. The long suspension may be inconsistent with the speech guarantee, for the penalty impaired
further speech by Salzhandler-he could not participate in union affairs or agitate for changes in union management.
Although speech may be unprotected from particular sanctions,
the courts could require that the penalty have some reasonable
relation to the offense. 175 A penalty which prohibits further
speech would seem to unduly infringe the speech guarantee.
On the other hand, union remedies, especially against libel, may
be inadequate from the union's standpoint. Members may not
be able to respond to fines or damages, and injunctions against
176
libel do not lie.
Furthermore, disciplinary procedures, although perhaps not
violative of section 101 (a) (5), may nevertheless have influenced
174. In addition, Salzhandler was removed from office. Although
the right to be an officer is not granted in Title I, a member's position
will be protected when loss of office is the result of a violation of statutory rights.
Summary removal of officers, however, is permissible; the procedural standards of § 101 (a) (5) do not apply. Grand Lodge of IAM v.
King, 335 F.2d 340 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964). The
court in Grand Lodge did not read "member" in § 101(a) (5) to exclude
officers but, rather, held that summary removal from office did not fall
within "otherwise discipline." Although the language is unclear, legislative history supports the court's conclusion. See, e.g., 2 LEG. isT. 1414-

15 (remarks of Senator Morse). The conference report states that the
section "applies only to suspension of membership in the union; it does
not refer to suspension of a member's status as an officer in the union."
H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1959); 1 LEG. HIsT. 935. See
also Senator Kennedy's remarks: "all the conferees agreed that this
provision does not relate to suspension or removal from a union office.
Often this step must be taken summarily to prevent dissipation or misappropriation of funds." 2 LEG. HIsT. 1433.
Summary dismissal, however, may violate common law procedural
safeguards, and state rights were expressly retained. Yet, a state injunction would seem to run counter to Congress' intention to permit
summary removal. This conflict suggests that section 103, which retains
•existing remedies under state law, may not carry its full literal meaning. For other examples of this type of unanticipated conflict, see
Summers, supra note 158, at 126-28.
175. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 '(1931).
176. See Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige 24 (N.Y. Ch. 1839); cf. Pound,
Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29
HARv. L. REv. 640 (1916).
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the court. The trial was held on February 23, 1961, and the
court stated that "not until April 2, 1961, did Salzhandler receive notice of the Trial Board's decision and his removal
from office and this was from a printed postal card mailed to
all members . . . . ,1 On April 4, the District Council mailed
Salzhandler "only the final paragraph of its five-page 'Decision'
.... ,171 Salzhandler "did not receive a copy of the full opinion of the Trial Board until after this action was commenced
on June 14, 1961." None of the above apparently violated the
due process provisions of section 101 (a) (5), but the court's use of
language suggests its displeasure with the procedures employed.
Although it is impossible to insulate such items from judicial
review, procedures should be judged solely under the provision
enacted for that very purpose.
Perhaps most significant for the court was its distrust of the
ability and objectivity of union tribunals. The court rejected
the parallel to first amendment speech and Beauharnaisv. Illinois, 1'7 9 stating that the danger to expression was overcome by
the protection afforded by judicial authority. "But the union is
not a political unit to whose disinterested tribunals an alleged
defamer can look for an impartial review of his 'crime.' "180
The court's decision on libel was clearly influenced by its feeling
that union tribunals were incapable of drawing the "thin and
tenuous line between libel and fair comment."' s '
The court's challenge was directed to the fairness as well as
-the objectivity of union trial boards.
The Trial Board in the instant case consisted of union officials,
not judges. It was a group to which the delicate problems of
truth or falsehood, privilege and "fair comment" were not familiar. Its procedure is peculiarly unsuited for drawing the fine
line between criticism and defamation, yet, were we to adopt the
view of the appellees, each charge of libel would be given a
trial de novo in the federal court-an impractical result not
likely contemplated by Congress ... and such a trial board
would be the final arbiter of the extent of the union member's
protection under § 101 (a) (2).182
The court's approach has support from Professor Summers:
The most difficult problem arises when a member is expelled for "slandering a union officer." Union debates are char177.
F.2d at
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

The card stated only the fact of his removal from office. 316
448.
Ibid.
343 U.S. 250 (1952).
316 F.2d at 450.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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acterised by vitriol and calumny, and campaigns for office are
salted with overstated accusations. Defining the scope of fair
comment in political contests is never easy, and in this context
is nearly impossible. To allow the union to decide this issue in
the first instance is to invite retaliation and repression and to
frustrate one of the principal reasons for protecting this rightto oust corrupt leadership through demoto enable members
183
cratic process.
The question of bias in union tribunals is not of recent
origin. Writers have long pointed out that although state courts
provided due process protection in obvious cases of bias, subtle
bias was often unprovable 8 4 The administration often controls
the trial board even if the officer slandered is not a member of
the board. Patronage is a fact of union life just as in political
life. Moreover, the action of the accused may have had some effect upon each member of the union. Many disciplinary cases
litigated arise from internal, factional struggles which often involve the entire membership. Thus, even if unbiased, members
are not uninterested. Tribunals consisting of union officers, specially elected committees, 8 5 or the entire membership" 6 may
be swayed less by the merits than by the strength of competing
8 7
factions.
Critics have called the failure of Congress to require truly
impartial, disinterested tribunals perhaps the greatest fault of
the act. Some have called for the encouragement of private,
impartial tribunals such as the Public Review Board of the
United Auto Workers, by creating a presumption of regularity
for disciplinary proceedings tried before such impartial boards. 8
Presumptions of bias would no doubt place a burden on unions
to create impartial tribunals. Such a step, however, seems too
great an interference with union autonomy. Title I clearly recognizes the need for discipline in some cases and contemplates
183. Summers, American Legislation for Union Democracy, 25 MODnax L. REV. 273, 287 (1962).
184. See Summers, Judicial Settlement of Internal Union Disputes,
7 BuFFALo L. REV. 405, 419 (1957). See also Taft, Judicial Procedures in
Labor Unions, 59 Q.J. EcoN. 370, 381-84 (1945).
185. See Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 151 N.E.2d 73 (1958).
186. See Dragwa v. Federal Labor Union, 136 N.J. Eq. 172, 41 A.2d
32 (Ch. 1945).
187. See Summers, DisciplinaryProcedures of Unions, 4 IwD. & LA.
REL. REV. 15, 25 (1950); Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 472, 482-87 (1964).
188. See Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 472, 489 (1964). The purpose and
operation of the Public Review Board is discussed in STIEBER, OBERER &
HAMRNGTON, UNION DEmOcRACY AND PUBLiC REVIEw (1960); Oberer, Voluntary Impartial Review of Labor: Some Reflections, 58 MrcH. L. Rnv.
55 (1959); Note, Public Review Boards: A Check on DisciplinaryPower,
11 STAx. L. Rv. 497 (1959).
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the use of union members as judges and juries. Furthermore,
section 101 (a) (5) sets out minimal procedural safeguards for
procedural due process:
No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended,
expelled, or otherwise disciplined except for non-payment of
dues by such organizations or by any officer thereof unless such
member has been (A) served with written specific charges; (B)
given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a
full and fair hearing.
Bias in trial boards is inconsistent with a full and fair
hearing.'8 9 Although the section may only be useful against
obvious cases of bias, Congress apparently felt that the section
and judicial review provided sufficient protection. Courts are
undoubtedly capable of enforcing and creating standards of procedural due process through section 101 (a) (5). Indeed, a body
of such protection has already been created by state courts. 190
Insistence on procedural protection may insure that the courts
will not have to pass on the merits of many cases and may provide a deterrence against the institution of disciplinary proceedings against other dissenters. Insistence on procedural safeguards involves less governmental interference than the creation of substantive rules as in Salzhandler.
The Second Circuit's opinion radiates far indeed. If union
tribunals are inherently biased, as the court assumed, then any
disciplinary proceedings would seem to fall within section 101
(a) (5). Obviously, however, Congress did not intend to prevent
all such proceedings. And, as the court correctly points out,
Congress probably did not intend to require a trial de novo in
district courts. The court's estimate of inherent bias cannot be
read to prevent all union disciplinary proceedings under section
101 (a) (5). The most likely interpretation of the court's statements, then, is that although bias may not be shown under section 101 (a) (5), the probabilities of unprovable bias are sufficiently great enough to affect the court's resolution of the substantive question. Thus, in a case of internal political activity,
for instance, the substantive balance of interests will be affected
by a presumption of bias.
The court has at least frankly admitted what could otherwise have only been surmized. Ironically, common law courts
often used procedural violations of union constitutions and bylaws to overturn disciplinary proceedings based upon distasteful
189. See Carroll v. Associated Musicians, 235 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.
N.Y. 1963).
190. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 168, at 200-06.
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substantive charges.1 9 The Second Circuit has reversed this
process-a presumption of bias and interest affects the substantive decision.
The court's admission may be based upon realistic understanding of union life, but it is doubtful whether the court's
position is consistent with congressional purpose. A procedural
provision was made part of Title I, and if it is not felt sufficient,
it would be better to redraft the act than warp other sections of
the act to fill the gap. Although the presumption of regularity
applying to administrative tribunals may be improper for private proceedings, the reversal of the presumption seems to go
further than the act provides.
In light of the precise question before the court, the prime
determinant in Salzhandler may have been the inability of laymen to draw technical legal lines rather than the disinclination
of the court to attempt such delineation. Thus, the court stressed
the difficulty of drawing lines between fair comment and slander. There is no question, though, that the court felt that the
difficulties are compounded by partial reviewers. As argued
above, however, union tribunals may not draw the simple libelprivilege line under the act. The proper standard is provided by
the proviso itself. The court overlooked the point, causing it to
protect all libelous statements. Furthermore, the court's severe
criticism of the union tribunal's partiality and ability ignores
congressional intention to permit disciplinary proceedings within
the framework provided by the act. Although libel may involve
the drawing of fine lines, difficult for lawyers and laymen alike,
the scope of a member's responsibility to his union as an institution is no less difficult to determine. The line between dual
unionism and responsible criticism of union policies is also difficult, yet Congress was aware that union tribunals are composed of laymen.
The libel-free speech line cannot be drawn by union tribunals, not because they cannot be trusted, but because such a line
is irrelevant to the purpose of the section 101 (a) (2) proviso.
Libelous and nonlibelous statements may or may not have an
impact upon a union as an institution sufficient to permit the
imposition of union discipline. Moreover, although libel and
slander involve legal definitions and principles, the union is
permitted to discipline conduct which would interfere with performance of its legal or contractual obligations. Thus, neither
191.

Id. at 175.
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the potential partiality of union tribunals nor their inability to
apply legal principles prevents the imposition of union discipline.
Although the decision of the court is no doubt correct, the
court's interpretation of legislative history is dubious at best, its
construction of the act is faulty, and the implications of its
statements are disturbing.
The concern of Congress to provide only minimal standards,
thereby limiting interference with union automony, should not,
however, prevent courts from scrutinizing trial procedures with
great care. The contract approach did not prevent state courts
from preventing discipline for conduct not falling within union
192
offenses or where there was no evidence to support the charge.
Section 101 (a) (5) should not be read in a narrower fashion. The
courts should be assured that the conduct falls at least within
the ambit of the provisions alleged to be violated under either
section 101 (a) (5)'s fair hearing standard or under the substantive
rights provision itself. Thus, although a dual unionism provision can be applied for disciplinary purposes in a proper case,
a member does not violate this responsibility unless there is
some evidence that his conduct can be properly considered dual
unionism within the constitutional provision or bylaw. And,
even though the conduct falls within the union's definition, the
grant of rights in section 101 (a) (2) requires the court to go further and determine if the union provision sweeps protected conduct under its prohibition.
The problem is presented most clearly in cases involving
substantive offenses with which the court has some sympathy.
Although the exercise of democratic rights within unions received substantial judicial protection under the common law,
Professor Summers has shown that these rights often evaporate
when exercised by alleged subversives. 193 The "very taint may
lead to outlawry" and "even due process is less due when claimed
192. In Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931), union
members who brought suit against officers to recover misappropriated
funds were charged with resorting to the court without exhausting
internal appeals. The New York Court of Appeals closely construed
the appeals provision and found that no internal appeals were available,
and, therefore, there was no violation. The contract approach thus
placed the courts in the powerful position to interpret union disciplinary
provisions. See Summers, supra note 168, at 181-85. The court's statement that they will not reweigh the evidence before the union tribunal
is often "but an apologetic prelude to a full re-evaluation of the evidence. . . ." Id. at 185.
193. See id. at 196-200. See also Summers, supra note 184, at 421-22.
A similar lack of sympathy is found in dual unionism cases. See Margolis v. Burke, 53 N.Y.S.2d 157 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
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by communists."' 94 Apparently the Landrum-Griffin Act does
not provide greater rights of speech and association in this type
of case than provided under New York's common law, for the
observation of Professor Summers also applies to a recent case
decided under the Labor Reform Act. In Rosen v. Painters,
Dist. Council 9,195 Rosen was suspended from union membership
for five years under a provision which barred union members
from associating with, or giving support to, the Communist
Party. 96 Rosen argued that the section was invalid on its face
under section 101 (a) (2). Although the precise ground for this
allegation was not stated in the opinion, it is probably significant that Rosen was not charged with membership in the Communist Party but merely with associating with or giving support
to the party. As Professor Summers pointed out in referring to
an earlier District Council 9 case involving charges of communism, "the argument that discipline solely for party member9 7
ship was contrary to public policy was turned bottoms up."'
Expulsion for communist membership, activities, or associations,
apparently is not only permissible, but a moral duty. Thus, the
Rosen court noted that "the post-war period witnessed a determined and bitter struggle by unions to purge their ranks of
those subversive elements subscribing to or supporting causes
deemed fundamentally inimical to the genuine interests of American labor."'9 8 The approach taken by the Rosen court is exactly the reverse of the court's decision in Salzhandler. The responsibility of the member to speak out, protected in Salzhandler, becomes unprotected in Rosen because the speaker associates with communists. In contrast to Salzhandler who had
the responsibility to speak out, the union has the responsibility
to weed out members such as Rosen.' 99 Inherent bias or laymen's lack of sophistication is apparently irrelevant. Thus, the
communist allegation provides a convenient device with which to
194. Summers, supra note 168, at 199.
195. 198 F. Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
196. The partiality of the Painter's district council for this penalty
may suggest that suspension, as opposed to expulsion, is thought less
likely to lead to judicial action by the disciplined member.
197. Summers, supra note 168, at 196, from Weinstock v. Ladisky,
197 Misc. 859, 873, 98 N.Y.S.2d 85, 99 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
198. Rosen v. District Council 9, 198 F. Supp. 46, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
199. The court's approach in Rosen should be compared to a New
York Court of Appeals decision which held that the loyalty oath required by the constitution of the Director's Guild was too vague and
broad under New York public policy. Hurwitz v. Directors Guild, 364
F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1966). The decision voided the particular oath before
it, but permitted oaths in principle.
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200

-purge the union of trouble makers.
Congressional debate clearly indicates that Title I provides
no bar to a union's attempt to rid its ranks of communists.
Senator Aiken, for example, defended the Kuchel substitute in
these words: "It was necessary to change the language so as to
enable the unions to expel the known communists and criminals,
who might otherwise have been frozen in a position of equality
with other members. ' 20 1 This clear congressional policy, however, should not be permitted to sanction the imposition of union
discipline upon vague or insubstantial charges of communist
affiliation.
As under the common law, the court's emphasis shifts quite
radically when faced with a question involving democratic rights
without a communist charge, and federal courts have not been
hesitant to follow Salzhandler. In Leonard v. MIT Employees
Union,20 2 the court upheld plaintiff's claim that his expulsion
violated the act. Citing Salzhandler with approval, the court
stated that "even if plaintiff had in fact carried his exercise of
his right of free speech to the extent of defaming the officers of
the union, he could not be disciplined by the union on that
ground." 20 3 In response to the union's contention that plaintiff's
statements weakened the union "at a critical moment in its
negotiations with the employer for a new contract," the court
replied that no rule existed which limited speech during contract
negotiations. Although the proviso requires a rule to discipline
speech or conduct, it is not reasonable to expect a union to draft
limiting rules covering the myriad of circumstances in which
derogatory statements could injure the union. The situations
might well be too numerous to contemplate explicit regulations,
and broadly stated rules would offer little more assistance than
the common "libel," "conduct injuring the union," or "unbecoming a member" clauses.
Ironically,-the court's suggestion that only very narrow rules
be used would not necessarily carry out the purposes of the
200. Such accusations were customarily made by the Rafferty administration of Painters District Council 9 in New York City. There
is a communist faction in the union, but the smear is used without
discrimination. See Schimpff, supra note 145, at 91; District Council
9 News, March-April 1966, p. 1, col. 1, and May-June 1966, p. 1, col. 1.
201. 2 LEG. HIrT. 1231.
202. 225 F. Supp. 937 (D. Mass. 1964).
203. Id. at 939-40. Other cases have used Salzhandler as a precedent.
See International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307 (9th Cir.
1965); Cole v. Hall, 56 L.R.R.M. 2606 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); Stark v. Twin City
Carpenters, 53 L.R,RM. 2640 (D. Minn 1963).
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proviso. A narrowly drawn rule limiting speech during negotiation periods could not be applied to all speech during that
period. The timing of the statements is only one of the many
factors which must be considered in balancing institutional and
individual interests. The approach advocated herein would require the court to see if the libel offense provision could properly be imposed in the precise situation. A libel provision specifically applying to speech during contract negotiations would
not significantly aid the balancing process and could, ironically,
overstress institutional security interests.
On the other hand, constitutional parallels are available to
suggest that overly broad or vague provisions in union constitutions may well deter protected speech. The chance that disciplinary action will be overturned in the federal court may offset deterrence only slightly since initial discipline provides a
stigma and members may not desire or be able to begin litigation.
Responsibility to the union, however, is likely to be interpreted
to permit discipline in only those cases where members should
have known their conduct seriously endangered their union's
stability. In these cases the fact that broad offenses such as
strikebreaking, creating dissension, or disclosing union secrets
are used, does not necessarily mean that the member had no
notice of the consequences of his acts. Furthermore, the substantive question of whether the union can properly penalize the
conduct is only the second step of the analysis. The court must
first find that the conduct falls within the penalty provisions of
union law.20 4 The power to interpret broad provisions restrictively or broadly, to allow substantial compliance or impose
literal conformity, can determine the outcome. Such power
should induce unions to draw offense provisions as narrowly as
205
possible.
This clash of individual and institutional interests is not
expressly recognized in the proviso. As mentioned earlier, section 101(a) (1), if read literally, also omits this critical balance.
A rule may be reasonable in the sense that it is necessary to
carry out valid institutional interests, yet its application in a
particular case may nevertheless be unreasonable. If the rule
204. Such interpretation by state courts often masked a substantive
attack on the discipline itself. See Summers, supra note 168, at 181-85.
205. The limits provided by normal contract interpretation rules
were not used by common law courts--"the intent of the parties is
unsought, even if discoverable; past practice is ignored or rejected; and
prior court decisions interpreting similar clauses are not precedents."
Id. at 184.
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only need be reasonable in the abstract, institutional interests receive a strong bias. The reasonable rules permitted by 101 (a) (1)
and 101 (a) (2), then, should pass a more rigorous test than
validity on their face. To pass muster, a rule must also be reasonable in application. 20° A less rigorous approach would seem
to run counter to the basic purpose of Title I.
Although preliminary relief has been granted where the
union charged vilification with malice, 207 another opinion impliedly supports the interpretation suggested. A district court, in
Deacon v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 20 8 declined to grant a temporary injunction restraining a union disciplinary hearing based upon charges of defamatory statements.
Plaintiff's statements to a local reporter were published. The
article stated that plaintiff recovered 28,000 dollars in a slander
suit against the union. The statement was admittedly false, but
the plaintiff alleged that he was misquoted. In any event, plaintiff argued that he should not have to exhaust internal remedies
or face a union disciplinary tribunal because of section 101 (a) (2).
Plaintiff was charged with violating a constitutional provision
which provided for the discipline of any member who discredited
the international union or any of its subdivisions.
The court rejected plaintiff's argument:
It cannot be said as a matter of law that such a statement
is not "an offense discreditable to the International Union ... "
nor can it be said as a matter of law ... the union is not adoptof
ing and enforcing "reasonable rules as to the responsibility
20 9
every member toward the organization as an institution."
If Salzhandler was correct, why should the court not interfere and prevent a trial proceeding? The union did not even
charge Deacon with libel; the charges were directed to Deacon's
public disclosure of his opinions rather than their content. Although accusations may damage the union as an institution, the
fact that the statements were public would not necessarily designate the statements as unprotected. There would seem to be
little value in permitting a union trial. Hope that the union
will do the right thing is perhaps offset by the risk that they
will not. Relief under section 102 is available when a right is
infringed, and perhaps plaintiff should have argued that a trial
206. The appropriate standard of rationality is unclear, but congressional concern for the protection of speech suggests the rigorous
first amendment standard should be used. In any event, a rule must
at least leave some means for the presentation of views.
207. Cole v. Hall, 56 L.R.R.M. 2606 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
208. 59 L.R.R.M. 2706 (S.D. Cal. 1965).
209. Id. at 2708.
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itself based upon protected conduct infringes section 101(a) (2)
rights. Indeed, such proceedings may well be a deterrent to
speech even though the result is not an imposition of a penalty.
The emotional impact of such proceedings may well deter the
exercise of rights, and the failure to subsequently impose a
penalty would seem to foreclose section 101 (a) (1) or (a) (2) relief. "Infringement" under section 102 is no doubt broader than
section 609 which refers to the imposition of discipline, but
whether a void proceeding is an infringement itself is unclear.
Assuming plaintiff has not lost his job or membership rights in
the interim, the question narrows to the deterrent effect of
this kind of proceeding. Two major underpinnings of the exhaustion rule are present in this case, although this is not an
exhaustion case. A union tribunal may decide not to penalize
the plaintiff, thus relieving the court of further obligation. Second, the principle of autonomy and self-regulation dictates that
unions have an opportunity to correct their own mistakes. 210 Although the court expressly reserved the question of the scope of
free speech in section 101 (a) (2), the implication is that all libel21
ous statements are not necessarily protected. '
Only two cases, however, have significantly analyzed the
proviso thus far, Salzhander,2 2 and Farowitz v. Associated
Musicians.21 3 The Salzhandler court felt that plaintiff's libel
could not violate his responsibility to the union; indeed, "it would
seem clearly in the interest of proper and honest management of
union affairs to permit members to question the manner in
which the union's officials handle the union's funds and how
they treat the union's members. ' 214 Since the act was "designed largely to curtail such vices as the mismanagement of
union funds, criticism of which ... is always likely to be viewed
by union officials as defamatory,"21 5 such statements should
be protected.
It is difficult to criticize the court's broad statement of pol210. See Summers, supra note 168, at 207-12. See also Blumrosen,
The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial
Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MICH. L. REv. 1435, 145759 (1963).
211. In Salzhandler, plaintiff had exhausted intraunion remedies.
The court expressly left open the question of whether plaintiff must
first exhaust remedies in a case involving free speech. Salzhandler v.
Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1963).
212. Ibid.
213. 330 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1964).
214. 316 F.2d at 450.
215. Id. at 451.
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icy. As mentioned earlier, certain types of speech, such as
criticism of the handling of finances or charges made in election
campaigns, may well deserve preferential treatment. The court's
statements, however, in the context of protecting libelous statements from disciplinary action, are too sweeping. Certain statements alleging mismanagement of funds, for instance, may violate a member's obligation to his union. Nor can it be stated as
a matter of law that all criticism dealing with subjects of primary congressional concern are protected in every situation.
The responsibility to criticize or speak out, for instance, does not
exist in a case in which the purpose of the criticism is solely to
weaken or undermine the union.
Treatment of the proviso by the courts, however, is likely
to be expansionary. In Farowitz, the Second Circuit again had
the opportunity to analyze the scope and meaning of the proviso.
Farowitz was disciplined for distributing leaflets urging the
membership not to pay a wage tax (a form of union dues) on
the ground that the union constitution and bylaws provided no
alternative to collection by orchestra leaders, declared unlawful
in Carroll v. Associated Musicians.216 The latter case held unlawful under section 302 of the NLRA the local's practice of
collecting through orchestra leaders in the single engagement
field the one and one half percent tax assessed to all working
members of the local. 21 7

The executive board of the union in

Farowitz issued a statement that the court had declared only
the leader's collection of the tax unlawful, and the membership
was still obliged under union bylaws to pay the tax.
Farowitz was thus charged with undermining the local by
urging nonpayment of dues after the executive board had assured the membership of the legality of the continued collection.
The union's bylaws,- the Farowitz court found, provided a reasonable basis for the union member's charge and the court found
no evidence that plaintiff intended to harm the union. Relying
upon Salzhandler, the court set aside the expulsion and ordered
the member's reinstatement.
It is easy to see why'*this case has confirmed the fears of
216.
217.

206 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
Section 302 of the LMRA, 61 Stat. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186

(1964), makes it illegal for unions to demand, or for an employer to
make, payments to unions representing his employees unless written
authorizations are obtained. No sideman had signed a written authorization. The Second Circuit, in Cutler v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 316
F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1963), upheld the lower court's finding that orchestra
leaders were employers within section 302.
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many unionists. The tax in this case represented union dues,
presumably necessary for the continued existence of the union.
The union's reading of the Carroll case was reasonable, but the
court found that Farowitz's contrary interpretation was also reasonable. Although the defendants could not prove that plaintiff

designed to undermine the union's very existence, officers of
the union naturally took this view.
In language echoing Salzhandler, the'court held that a member's responsibility to the union as an institution "surely cannot
include any obligation that he sit idly by while the union follows
a course of conduct which he reasonably believes to be illegal
because of what a court of law has stated."218 Would the statements made by Farowitz be protected if his view of the union
constitution was unreasonable? In Salzhandler, the court stated
that a member should not be forced to draw the thin and tenuous line between what is libelous and what is not. If libelous
statements are to be protected, Farowitz's statements would probably be protected even if based upon an unreasonable interpretation of the union constitution. Whether reasonable or not, however, the question remains whether the statements significantly
weakened the union as an institution. This case treads close to
the line as the denial of dues to a union threatens the union as
an ongoing institution. Farowitz was not only stating his views,
but he21attempted
to rally other members to withhold tax pay0
ments.
The court characterizes Farowitz's leaflets as "one rational
method of testing its [the tax's] validity and forcing an alteration
in union policy, such as an amendment of the by-laws which
might provide for a proper means of collecting the dues or taxes
218.

330 F.2d at 1002.

219. This case reflects a continuing dispute within Local 802 between
full time and part time musicians. Local 802 has approximately 28,000
members, but only 5,000 earn their livelihood by playing full time. Full
time musicians have understandably felt threatened by the vast majority of members with slight attachment to the industry. Although all
members pay the same dues, performing musicians pay an additional
1%,% tax on their earnings. Thus, they feel they have a greater
financial stake in union affairs. Work taxes are paid to slightly exceed
dues each year. Thus, the small groups of active musicians are contributing, in addition to dues, an amount greater than total dues paid by
the entire membership. See Union Democracy in Action, No. 17, Jan.
1966, pp. 1-2.
The active musicians are said to be the active unionists. Ibid. This
might explain the continuing attempt by the actives to elect officers at
union meetings or halls rather than by mail referenda. See Gurton v.
Axons, 339 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1964); Gurton v. Manuti, 56 L.R.R.M. 2307
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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from the membership. '2 20 Perhaps a more rational approach
would have been a suit challenging the imposition of dues if, as
alleged, no method existed in the union constitution for collecting
them. Farowitz was testing the validity of the tax only in the
sense that the question of validity could conceivably arise in a
disciplinary action against him or in a suit by the union to collect
dues.
The court did suggest that there may be some situations in
which a union member would not be protected: "All we decide
is that a member having such good reasons as here to believe
that the collection of taxes or dues runs afoul of the law has the
right to call this to the attention of the membership
and to urge
221
that they refrain from paying such assessments.1
D. THE PROVISo, DUAL UNIoNIsM, AND THE NLRA
Analysis of the proviso might be helpful in the context of
the most serious challenge to union stability, dual unionism.
Faced with jurisdictional challenges from the Knights of Labor
in the late nineteenth century, American unions early developed
a strong abhorrence to dual unionism. Unionists learned that
unions with overlapping jurisdictions inevitably meant rival
unions222 and such competition sapped the strength of the labor
movement. Thus, only one union was to have title to particular
work. "Only one national union in the territory covered ...
can be a legitimate union. Any rival local, sectional or national
union is an outlaw [dual] union."223 Every local has a charter
setting out its territory or trade boundary and must belong to
the national representing that trade or be labeled as an outlaw
union.224 Jurisdiction of a union is considered a property right
and the charter is certificate of title.2 25 "Given the importance
of property rights in American life, it is easy to see why jurisdictional disputes generate the ardor usually associated with religious conflicts.1226 The ardor of external jurisdictional dis220. 330 F.2d at 1002.
221. Ibid.
222. See ULwAN, TnE RisE OF mE NATIONAL TRADE UNION 367, 404-05
(1955).
223. See Barnett, The Causes of JurisdictionalDisputes in American
Trade Unions, 9 Harv. Bus. Rev. 400, 401 (1931).

224. See Whitney, Jurisdiction of the American Building Trade
Unions, 32 JoHNs HoPKINs UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 100 (1914).
225. Dunlop, JurisdictionalDisputes, N.Y.U. 2D CONF. ON LABOR 477,

482 (1942).
226. Atleson, The NLRB and JurisdictionalDisputes: The Aftermath
of CBS, 53 GEo. L.J. 93, 94 (1964).
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putes is matched by internal efforts to combat treasonous members, and treason from within is always more disturbing than
aggression from without.

227

The ideal dual union clause is one which is carefully written to apply only to the support of a rival union seeking to
replace the organization as bargaining agent. Such a clause may
validly be applied in a proper case under the section 101 (a) (2)
proviso. A 1959 study, however, revealed that few union constitutions contained well drafted, clearly written clauses which
prohibit secession movements or support of a union seeking to
supplant the organization as bargaining agent.228
Dual union clauses may properly be used to discipline members for speech or conduct only if the member's action can be
229
said to violate an obligation owed to the union as an institution.
227. Seidman and Melcher distinguish rival unionism, labor organizations with conflicting organizational claims, and dual unionism, unions
declared to be in conflict with the union's jurisdiction. Seidman &
Melcher, The Dual Union Clause and Political Rights, 11 LAB. L.J. 797
(1960). Apparently the distinction is between an objective phenomenon and a subjective evaluation. "[N]ot all rival unions are declared
to be dual, whereas factional political groups, not functioning as unions,
may be banned as dual unions." Id. at 797 n.l.
228. Ibid. Only twelve of the ninety-four unions studied possessed
well drafted clauses.
One-third of the unions studied punished dual unionism without
clearly defining the term or by using closely related language. The
possible abuse of clauses referring to joining or assisting organizations
which are hostile or detrimental to the union is obvious. Since the officers may state the goals of the union, they may define which organizations have aims hostile to those goals. Eight unions were found with
dual union clauses which were readily usable against internal as well
as external groups.
229. In Johnson v. Local 58, IBEW, 181 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich.
1960), a group of union members and nonmembers joined together to
persuade the IBEW to grant them a local charter covering a geographical
area which overlapped that of Local 58. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants
disturbed their meeting and threatened their job rights. The court rejected a motion to dismiss but implied that plaintiffs' conduct was protected by § 101 (a) (2). Since the act was aimed at protecting members,
the court dismissed as to those plaintiffs who were not members of the
union. On the merits, it would seem that Local 58 could legitimately
claim that plaintiffs were engaged in dual unionism since activities seeking to limit the jurisdiction of a union would seem to fall within the term.
Yet, plaintiffs' conduct was not dual as far as the international was concerned. From its perspective, plaintiffs were engaged in an internal
dispute. The case could be reversed-a group of local members might
seek to disaffiliate from a corrupt or ineffectual international. To
which union should plaintiffs' actions be determined to be responsible
or irresponsible? Requesting a new local charter recognizes the hegemony of the international, although it seriously threatens the institutional
stability of the local. On the other hand, such action might be the
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Courts following Salzhandlermay be less interested in protecting
conduct alleged to be dual unionism because, although speech is
involved, the speech may not refer to matters central to congressional concern. The line becomes hazy, however, when a
member seeks disaffiliation or urges support for a rival local because of alleged malpractices by union officials. In this case a
member would seem initially obligated to attempt reform within the union.
Urging members to join another union, seek decertification
of the union as bargaining agent, or support a rival union are
activities which seem to fall within the area of permissible
union discipline. Support for a rival union is not always punishable, however, for such support during a representation election
campaign may well be protected. 23 0 Since the NLRA grants the
right to displace the union from its status as bargaining representative, 231 perhaps activity which seeks only to displace the
union from its status should not be subject to limitation by internal union provisions.23 2 Yet, a member who advocates a
change of bargaining representative is challenging the union as
an institution-a union has little raison d'etre if it has no collec233
tive bargaining functions.
Use of these clauses against internal political groups, of
course, is not permissible, since opposition to the current administration is not the same as opposition to the union as an
institution. 234 The use of these clauses to insure a common front
only effective way for some members to rid themselves of an entrenched
union administration. Seeking disaffiliation from the international does
not necessarily threaten the local, and it should not be able to discipline
for such activity.
230. Dunau, Some Comments on the Bill of Rights of Members of
Labor Organizations,N.Y.U. 14TH CoNF. ox LABOR 77, 84-85 (1961); Summers, supra note 168, at 190.
231. NLRA § 9(c) (1) (A) (ii), 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159
(1964).
232. See Rosenberg, Interpretive Problems of Title 1, 16 IND. & Lan.
REL. REV. 405, 418 (1962).
233. A separate problem exists when a local committee is formed to
disassociate from the international. The international no doubt has
some power to protect itself, but the local as an institution is not necessarily affected or threatened. One writer suggests that a member may
seek to displace the union from its status as bargaining representative
but may not seek disassociation from the international. See Rosenberg,
supra note 232, at 418. Yet, each situation is serious, and the fact that
the NLRA protects the former does not mean that the latter conduct is
a lesser threat to internal security.
234. State courts have refused to equate loyalty to the union with
loyalty to incumbent officers. Thus, in Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283,
151 N.E.2d 73 (1958), the court protected the right to form an opposition
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to management, without factionalism and its accompanying divisiveness, is likewise prohibited despite real institutional interests in unity. Thus, it will be necessary to prove that disciplined members have urged or aided secession or decertification
and not simply that members have supported groups hostile to
the union administration.
Initially, the application of dual union clauses, especially to
those filing decertification petitions, might seem inconsistent
with the rights granted by the NLRA. The Taft-Hartley amendment to section 7,235 granting workers the right to refrain from
union activities, and the Wagner Act's right to join and support
unions, 236 protects union members who wish to change their
membership or change the bargaining representative. The
NLRA, however, primarily protects workers against loss of em237
ployment rather than loss of union membership.
The NLRB has zealously guarded its own procedures. Despite union constitutional provisions, a union may not expel a
member for filing an unfair labor practice charge against the
union without first exhausting intraunion remedies. 238 The
Board thus extended an earlier ruling holding that a union coerces a member within section 8(b) (1) (A)239 when it fines a
member for filing a charge without exhausting union remedies.

240

group within the union, and was reluctant to construe such conduct as
advocacy of mass withdrawal from the union. See also Scivoletti v.
Leckie, 4 App. Div. 2d 773, 165 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1957); Lafferty v. Fremd,
36 L.R.R.M. 2674 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955).
235. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
236. NLRA § 7, 61 Stat. 452 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
237. The Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc and dividing 4-3, held that
union members cannot legally be fined for crossing picket lines. AllisChalmers Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1966). Reversing its initial decision, 60 L.R.R.M. 2097 (7th Cir. 1965), the court held that fining
members who worked during a strike and threatening suit to secure payment coerced members in the exercise of § 7 rights. Thus, the court
extended the protection afforded to § 7 rights beyond loss of employment. The decision leads to the dubious result that unions may expel
members who cross picket lines but may not impose fines. The decision
raises serious questions about a union's authority to carry out its functions and seems to conflict with the implications of the § 101 (a) (2)
proviso.
238. Van Camp Sea Food Co., 62 L.R.R.M. 1298 (1966).
239. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1964).
240. Skura (Local 138, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs), 148
N.L.R.B. 679 (1964). Skura overruled past administrative decisions that
interference with § 7 rights were insufficient unless accomplished bk
threats, violence or job discrimination. See NLRB Gen. Counsel Admin.
Ruling, Case No. 1059, 35 L.R.R.M. 1167 (Nov. 19, 1954); Note, 41
N.Y.U.L. REv. 584, 590 (1966).
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The use of other Board procedures, however, does not receive the same protection. Thus, unions may discipline members
who file decertification petitions because such petitions attack
the very existence of the union as an institution.241 The Board
reasoned that a decertification petition, unlike an unfair labor
practice charge, is an attack on the union itself, and thus, a
matter of union concern. Defensive action by the union, such as
expulsion, is proper for "to require them to tolerate an active
opponent within their ranks would undermine their collective ac242
tion and thereby tend to distort the results of the election.1
The Board has distinguished unfair labor practice charges
which relate to past events, and involve the public interest in
securing obedience to the act, and representational disputes,
which affect future elections. Furthermore, the right to invoke
Board processes was narrowed to invocation for the sole purpose of compelling obedience to the act.243 Since both rights
are protected by the act, however, the Board has decided the
right to bring unfair labor practice charges, necessary to invoke
Board responsibility, is more important than the right to seek
decertification, especially since the NLRB finds institutional interests significant. Especially significant is the fact that the exercise of rights or procedures under the NLRA will not necessarily be safeguarded from union discipline. Given this result,
rights granted by the NLRA are less than perfect indicators of
the scope of member freedom and =nion disciplinary power under LMRDA.
Although the NLRB's distinction may well be dubious, the
distinction roughly approximates the permissible scope of discipline under the LMRDA. Indeed, the language used to distinguish the decertification case is probably drawn from section
101 (a) (2). Possible conflict could arise when a member files an
unfair labor practice charge, protected from disciplinary sanction, which arguably violates a responsibility owed to the union.
Although a member's responsibility to his union would not normally conflict with rights granted by federal law, a member
could frustrate an election campaign. by filing unfair labor practice charges. In this situation the Board holds the election in
abeyance until the unfair labor practice charge is resolved. Such
delaying tactics, especially when engaged in by members rather
than employers, may have an effect on the ultimate election.
241. Tawas Tube Prods., Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 46 (1965).
242. Van Camp Sea Food Co., 62 L.R.R.M. 1298, 1301 (1966).
243. Note, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 584, 593 (1966).
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Yet the Board will prevent discipline, although it may be per244
mitted by the LMIRDA.
Whether the Board will protect frivolous charges or charges
filed to harass or weaken the union is unclear. Assuming that
this conduct is unprotected by the LMRDA, such action by the
Board would greatly minimize conflict between the two statutes.
It may often be extremely difficult, however, to determine
whether charges were filed in bad faith or to undermine the
union. The Board might find it administratively wiser to protect all complainants.
Title I is cast in terms of individual rights rather than institutional rights. Thus the union has no statutory right to
sanction unprotected conduct. Congress' primary concern to
protect individual rights suggests that a liberal accommodation
between the two statutes is necessary. Thus, although conduct
may be unprotected by Title I, and discipline would not violate
the LMIRDA, discipline may still be improper under the NLRA.
That is, since Title I grants rights to members rather than unions,
permissible discipline under the LMRDA is not necessarily
proper under other federal statutes.
V. ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE I RIGHTS
Rights under Title I are enforced by civil actions in federal
courts brought by individual members. 245 A criminal provision
partially overlaps section 102. Under section 610248 it is unlawful for any person to use force, coercion or intimidation for
the purpose of interfering with statutory rights. Willful violation is punishable by a fine of not more than 1,000 dollars or
imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. Unlike sections 102 and 609, section 610 is directed against any person and,
244. Actions under the LMRDA are not preempted even though the
conduct involved is arguably subject to the NLRA. It would seem, however, that the two laws should be read so as not to conflict. See Burris
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 224 F. Supp. 277 (W.D.N.C. 1963);
Thomas v. Penn Supply & Metal Corp., 35 F.R.D. 17 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
245. LMRDA § 609, 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 529 (1964), makes
it unlawful to "fine, suspend, expel or otherwise discipline any of its
members" for exercising any right granted under the act. The provisions of § 102 are expressly "applicable in the enforcement of this section." As far as Title I is concerned, however, § 102 is sufficient for all
violations of rights granted under that Title. Since discipline imposed
for exercising Title I rights infringes rights secured by § 102, § 609 adds
nothing to the enforcement of Title I. For the legislative history of §§
102 and 609, see Rothman, Legislative History of the "Bill of Rights" for
Union Members, 45 Mbx-x. L. REv. 199, 216-19 (1960).
246. 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 530 (1964).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:403

thus, has been held to apply to other union members or officers
not acting in their representative capacity. 247 The courts have

rejected the argument that section 610 is merely the criminal
counterpart of section 102. Defendants have argued that neither section 102 nor section 610 creates rights, but rather, each
merely supplies sanctions for violation of rights protected by
the act. In rejecting these claims, courts have stressed the broad
language of section 610 vis-a-vis section 102.
Section 610, then, enforces a right which is not given under
Title I, that is, a right against members or officers not acting in
their representative capacity. The act has been read to provide
no civil remedy for vindication of Title r rights against one who
is not acting in the capacity of an official or an agent of a labor
union.248 Thus, the civil remedies under the act focus only on
the union-member relationship.
Although the courts seem correct in holding that "any person" in section 610 is broader than the union-member relationship, courts have completely overlooked the absence of any limitation on the source of interference in section 102. Section 101
(a) (2) grants rights to every member, and section 102 provides a
federal cause of action for "any person whose rights secured by
the provisions of this title have been infringed by any violation of
this title." Thus, rights are given to -members without limitation
as to possible infringers of those rights. Of course, actions by
members may be covered if the conduct is requested or ordered
by officers or if the aggressor has conspired with officers. Although Congress primarily sought to affect the union-member
relationship, such relationship can also be affected by actions of
members who are not acting in an official capacity. Furthermore, the principle of union democracy and the concern over
individual rights suggests that rights be protected from interference by any member of the union.
Writers have generally assumed that the limited interpre,tation of section 102 is correct, assuming that the- act was not
intended to provide a tort'.remedy. Yet, making sections 102
and 610 parallel in scope Would still provide an area of protection narrower than. tort. because plaintiff would have to demonstrate that the conduct'infringed rights secured by Title J.249
247. See United States v. Bertucci, -333 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1964);
United States v. Roganovich, 318 F.2d 187 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 911 (1963).
248.

See Tomko v. Hilbert, 288 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1961).

249. For a similar argument, see Dtua, supra note 230, at 86.
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As originally introduced, section 102 would have required
an aggrieved union member to file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor, the remedy provided by Title IV. The Kuchel
substitute, however, substituted the present provision permit-

ting individual suits.250
When Senator Kuchel introduced this change, he commented:
[H]ere is one of the major changes in the proposal. The
amendment of the Senator from Arkansas provided that the
Secretary of Labor might, on behalf of the injured or aggrieved
member, have the right to litigate the alleged grievance and to
seek an injunction or other relief. We believe that giving this
type of right to the aggrieved employee member himself is in
the interest of justice, and therefore we propose to eliminate
from the
bill the right of the Secretary of Labor to sue in his
25 1
behalf.
Senator Clark stated the amendment "takes the Federal bureaucracy out of this bill of rights and leaves its enforcement
to union members, aided by the courts."2 5 2 It is naive, however,
to assume that union members are perfectly free to bring suits
in federal district courts against their union. Social pressures,
as well as serious economic ones, deter such suits. Furthermore, the strict interpretation given to Title I by the courts deters lawyers from recommending litigation. The paucity of cases
under 101 (a) (1) and 101 (a) (2) suggests that few union members
have been motivated to litigate.
The cost of suit is likely to be heavy, and workers have little
money to pay lawyers' fees and prepare records. Even if the
suit is successful, there are relatively few situations in which
an attorney can secure compensation. "Most men are reluctant
to incur financial expense in order to vindicate intangible
25 3
rights."Furthermore, there is a great disparity in financial resources,
and time is always on the side of the defendants. In internal
union cases, defendants usually have the financial resources to
stall or finance costly procedural maneuvers and extended appeals, thus causing plaintiff to incur further expense. 254 The
250. The only exception in Title I is the right to receive a copy of
the collective bargaining contract, a right granted by § 104 and enforced
by civil actions by the Secretary of Labor under § 210.
251. 2 LEG. IIST. 1232.
252. Id. at 1233.
253. See Hardman, Labor Courts for Labor Democracy, New Leader,
Jan. 25, 1960, p. 20; Lipset, The Law and Trade Union Democracy, 4TVA.
L. R v. 1, 27 (1961).
254. See Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts
Do in. Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 221 (1960); Summers, The Usefulness of
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resolution of motions and appeals may take years. 255 This delay
drains the financial resources of the member as well as his resolve to continue the action. During this time, his participatory
rights in union affairs are limited or nonexistent unless, of
course, disciplinary penalties are stayed. Even attorneys who
willingly accept cases with little chance of renumeration may
begin to doubt the worth of the undertaking.
As far as social pressures are concerned, some members
have nothing to lose. Plaintiffs tend to be members who have
been expelled, heavily fined, or removed from union office.
Those suffering lighter penalties, receiving small fines for instance, or those objecting on principle to some undemocratic
practice, will not be induced to bring suit. Perhaps this was
envisioned by the drafters since any suit drains union funds,
takes time and expense, and may cause hostility and rifts within the union. However, Congress apparently wanted members to
sue if they had a meritorious claim, and many claims are meritorious even though the harm to the plaintiff is not particularly great.
The original McClellan proposal, stated in broad terms, might
not have placed the government too firmly in internal union affairs. Realistically, the Secretary of Labor is not a person one
would assume would interfere in internal union affairs with relish. The Secretary is susceptible to many political pressures,
including those from officers of large and important unions whose
cooperation he needs. 256 However, just as it is not difficult to
imagine union officers being threatened with civil rights suits or
the withdrawal of federal highway funds if they do not modify
their wage demands to meet administrative wage-price guidelines, so it is not difficult to imagine the Secretary of Labor
threatening Landrum-Griffin actions unless officers conform to
Washington's idea of normative behavior. Yet, private enforcement probably discourages the filing of civil actions by members who might be willing to file a charge with an administrative agency.
Certainly, at a minimum, the act should provide counsel fees
in successful actions out of the union treasury. This would not
necessarily increase the number of capricious suits, but would
Law in Achieving Union Democracy, 48 Am. EcoN. REv. 44, 48 (Supp. 1,
1958).
255. The author is acquainted with a case which has been before a
district court for over six years and, although still at the pleading stage,
is being appealed.
256. For a skeptical view, see Lipset, supra note 253, at 32.
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aid the member who has a meritorious claim but cannot afford
the time and expense of hiring a lawyer and fighting a case
against an opponent with vast financial resources. 257 Such a
remedy is provided under Title V, providing for civil actions to
rectify financial misdeeds. 258

Of course, Title V is similar to a

stockholder's derivative suit. Plaintiff's suit is brought in the
name of the union itself; therefore, it is proper to reimburse the
member for attorney's fees. The recovery of funds benefits the
union as a whole rather than any individual member. The action
is not for damages because of peculiar harm suffered by any
member, but for injury to the union. However, plaintiffs who
are successful in Title I actions are acting for the interest of all
of the members of the union, although they are basically protecting their own interest. 259

The plaintiff could be considered as

protecting rights belonging to all members and, if his claim is
upheld, he should be reimbursed for all legal costs incurred in
protecting common rights. Each successful action encourages expression and questioning by other union members, and, perhaps
to some extent deters similar disciplinary action against these
members. This proposal would not create an incentive for capricious suits, for cost recovery would exist only in meritorious
cases.
The availability of a damage remedy in some cases is of little
help. The uncertainty of victory and obstacles to recovering from
260
union treasuries make an attorney's compensation unlikely.
The beneficence of a self-sacrificing attorney, or the right to
file as a pauper with typewritten briefs, alleviates the problem
only slightly. Perhaps more significant is that many cases involve factional fights involving groups of members. Professor
Summers argues that the cost burden is not as great as might
appear because the cost burden can be shared. Furthermore,
257. See McGraw v. Plumbers, 341 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1965).

258. Section 501(b) grants the discretionary authority to allot "a
reasonable part of the recovery... to pay the fees of counsel ... and
to compensate [a member] for any expenses necessarily paid or incurred by him in connection with the litigation." 73 Stat. 535 (1959),
29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1964). Reasonable fees, then, are limited by the
amount recovered.
259. This concept was stated long ago in Irwin v. Possehl, 143 Misc.
855, 858, 257 N.Y. Supp. 597, 600 (Sup. Ct. 1932): "If any member is
deprived of [his] equal right[s], not only is an injustice done to that
individual, but the entire class suffers."
260. New York courts have uniformly refused to award attorney's
fees. See, e.g., Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931); Metzler
v. Conrad, 276 App. Div. 865, 93 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1949); Coleman v. Engelking, 272 App. Div. 805, 70 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1947).
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many lawyers take cases seeking future clients or subsequent
to become
nonlabor work or, especially in election cases, hoping
261
victorious.
are
dissidents
the
if
counsel
the union's
Of course, costs of suit and appeal can create serious difficulties even for a substantial organized group. 262 Few individuals become plaintiffs if they are not backed up by a group
which has raised money from its members:
Even then, unless the recovery of a large sum of money or the
definite control of the union goes to the winner, a faction will
hesitate to enter into litigation. It is a rare group of men that
will undertake the many pressures and difficulties mentioned,
263
merely to establish the principle of union democracy.
Indeed,
the single individual is less likely to seriously consider
suit.2 64 Add to this the unfamiliarity of attorneys with the law
of internal union affairs, the lack of legislative history for an
ambiguous statute, and tough pleading requirements, 265 and it is
doubtful that single individuals receive significant protection.
Assuredly, there are lawyers who accept internal union
cases even though there is little chamce of compensation. Presumably, however, many meritorious claims do not even reach
this point. An individual might very well be cowed by the
burden of challenging the union, an organization to which he
may have strong ties. Furthermore, workers may be unfamiliar
with the law and probably have had little, if any, contact with
261. See Summers, supra note 254, at 221.
262. See id. at 221 n.274. H.W. Benson, editor of Union Democracy
in Action, described an insurgent group as living "on its own stubborn
spirit. It collects dimes and dollars. A reform leader works all day and
tries to be a Superman at night. Insurgents crank little second-hand
mimeograph machines. No advice, no lawyers, no trained writers, no
staff." Union Democracy in Action, No. 11, Jan. 1964, p. 3.
263. Strauss & Willner, Government Regulation of Local Union
Democracy, 4 LAB. L.J. 519, 530 (1953).

264. Professor Summers states that individual cases go by default
since many lawyers refuse to take cases unsupported by factional groups.
See Summers, supra note 254, at 222.
265. In Scovile v. Watson, 338 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1964), a plaintiff
complained that he was not permitted to raise a motion to reconsider the
union's failure to arbitrate a discharge. The complaint was dismissed
for failure to state that plaintiff's motion was in order and proper for
consideration at that time. Since few meritorious claims find their way
to district courts, the court's feeling that specificity is required to prevent
"frivolous law suits initiated by dissident members" is dubious. In
Yanity v. IAVI, Civil No. 9440, W.D.N.Y., Dec. 31, 1962, allegations that
members were not "permitted to speak without interruption" were held
insufficient. Plaintiffs apparently must specifically allege that the proviso or reasonable rule limitation in § 101 (a) (2) does not apply. But see
George v. Bricklayer's Union, 255 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Wis. 1966).
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attorneys before.260 Thus, they hesitate to become involved in
legal proceedings. Furthermore, members are cognizant of enormous risks, feeling that entrenched officers have legal and illegal
ways of "taking care" of a troublesome member. 267 Therefore,
even alleviation of the cost burden would not remove all of the
2 68
obstacles to suit.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The sparse litigation under Title I does not necessarily indicate that the act has had little effect. Although many observers
feel that the act has had a beneficial effect,2 69 evidence of such
an effect is lacking. Observers have pointed out voluntary re2 70
forms of internal procedures undertaken by many unions.
However, the evidence does not suggest that these reforms have
benefited union members greatly.27 1 There is a trend toward
more formalized union disciplinary procedures with explicit guarantees and statements of members' obligations to the unions.
Although members' obligations and rights may now be clearly
spelled out, certainly a desired result, clearer statements of obligations owed to the union may not significantly expand members' rights under union law.
Some observers feel that increased responsiveness to members' wishes will result in greater militancy, irresponsibility, and
intransigence at the bargaining table and increased use of the
grievance procedures. 2 72 Some observers have noted a wave of
266. See Hardman, Labor Courts for Democracy, New Leader, Jan.
25, 1960, p. 20.
267. See Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Relations Act of 1959, 58 MICH. L. REv.819 (1959).
268. The unfamiliarity and hesitation of union members to involve
themselves with the law can be traced to characteristics of working people in general. Their 'norms include avoiding involvement with community authorities in general and with the law in particular." Lipset,
supra note 253, at 27-28.
269. See, e.g., Aaron, The Union Members "Bill of Rights": FirstTwo
Years, 1 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 47, 71 (Feb. 1962).
270. Ibid.; Swankin, Union Disciplinary Powers and Procedures, 86
MoNTHLY LABOR REv. 49 (Pt. 4 1963), states that of seventy unions holding conventions between the signing of the LNRDA and late 1961, fiftyfive, with a membership of over nine million, amended one or more constitutional provisions relating to the discipline of officers and members.
Many unions also amended election provisions, primarily related to
"specific requirements of the Act."

U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR,
STITUTIONS AND THE ELECTION OF LOCAL UNxON OFFICERS 8,

UNION CoN-

14-16 (1965).
271. See Young v. Hayes, 195 F. Supp. 911 (1961), where amendments deemed "necessary" by the international tended to create more
centralized control.
272. See Aaron, The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
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officers, especially by
rebellion by locals against international
273
rejecting negotiated settlements.
Governmental protection of individual and political rights
will not guarantee that the rights will be exercised, nor does it
promise that the traditional apathy of union members to union
affairs will be significantly affected. Fear is only one reason
that members submit to official abuse of authority; another
27 4
reason is the primary concern of members for material gains.
The act does not alter this concern. The law attempts to tread
an ill-defined line by preventing the destruction of opposition
groups while also attempting to prevent disruptive splintering by
recognizing institutional security interests. Using law to
strengthen the day-to-day operation of democratic self-government is a difficult task. Legal commands cannot create members
willing to insist on democratic practices and procedures, nor can
275
they change apathy and indifference.
The act does set a moral code, more explicit than the law of
many states although not necessarily as broad in scope. The
hope of most legislation, labor as well as nonlabor, is to set moral
standards in areas previously unregulated by explicit moral
guides.2 7 6 Hopefully, Title I has made officers more sensitive
to individual rights as well as removed some deterrents to a
member's willingness to question or criticize union policies.
By creating moral standards, the public and union members now
have expectations about institutional behavior that may induce
even greater responsibility on the part of union officials.

Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REV. 851, 906 (1960); Lipset, supra note 253, at
33-34. Arbitrators have expressed the belief that more dubious and
even frivolous grievances are being brought to arbitration by unions.
Yet, from the standpoint of national policy, it is doubtful that oligarchic
unions are preferable.
273. COLE, CuRRENT TRNDs IN COLLECTIm BARGAININc 2 (1960). The
rebellion of airline mechanics against the IAM international officers in
1959, used as an example by Mr. Cole, has recently been repeated.
274. See Seidman, Democracy and Trade Unionism, 48 Am. EcoN.
REv. 35, 41 (Supp. 1, 1958).
275. Professor Wellington in 1958 suggested that an expanded doctrine of fair representation was preferable to legislation of union democracy because principles of federalism suggested that regulation of union
admission, discipline, and elections be left to the states and because
federal legislation would not accomplish its object. Wellington, Union
Democracy and Fair Representation: FederalResponsibility in a Federal
System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1361-62 (1958).
276. See iUpset, supra note 253, at 35.

